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 The issue of adolescent delinquency – both how it should be understood and how it 
should be addressed – has been at the forefront of psychology for some time. Recently, 
neuroscientific examinations have addressed issues related to the development of delinquency 
primarily from two distinct research lines: i) as an outcome related to psychopathological 
functioning; or ii) as an unfortunate side effect of normative adolescent development. However, 
much of this work may not be adequately capturing the scope of the problem, either as a function 
of limiting the theoretical frameworks used to address delinquency or as a function of simply not 
including actively delinquent samples. To remedy these issues, my research program examined 
processes implicated in adolescent delinquency from a broader social motivation theory, with an 
explicit focus on including actively delinquent adolescents and comparing their performance 
(both behavioral and neural) to their normatively developing peers.  In study 1, I examined how 
emotion regulation difficulties in adolescence were often contextual, as actively delinquent 
adolescents show differential behavioral and neural patterns corresponding to disruption. In 
study 2, I examined how adolescent’s antisocial behaviors ought to be more thoroughly 
examined, as they may guide neural processing of exploitive social scenarios. Finally, in study 3, 
I examined how antisocial motivations guided both attentional processing and social decision-
making. By taking a social neuroscience approach, I have highlighted how previously held 
findings may be limited in scope and highlighted a need for researchers to examine how 
antisocial behaviors and motivations develop and sustain delinquency. Given the cost of the 
problem, exploring the motivational underpinnings of delinquency through neuroscientific 
techniques may prove fertile ground for making significant treatment inroads. 
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CHAPTER 1: HOW TO UNDERSTAND ADOLESCENT DELINQUENCY 
Since the onset of the “decades of the brain,” there has been a drive to utilize 
neuroscientific research to provide insight for informed policy decisions and intervention 
applications (Miller, 2010). One such area where this application of neuroscience is needed is for 
the reduction of suboptimal adolescent outcomes. There are many reasons for such a focus on 
adolescence. It has been conceptualized as a transitional period marked by turmoil (Ayman-
Nolley & Taira, 2000), where a litany of problematic outcomes show increases, such as in risk-
taking behaviors (Brener et al., 2013), psychopathology (Cicchetti & Rogosch, 2002), mortality 
(CDC: Heron, 2017; Xu, Kochanek, Murphy & Tejada-Vera, 2016), and delinquency (Mason, 
Hitch, Kosterman, McCarty, Herrenkohl, & Hawkins, 2010). Delinquency is particularly 
important to reduce, based on the exorbitant cost it places on society in terms of economics 
(Delisi & Gatling, 2003), scholastic loss (Phillips, 2012), victim suffering (Juvonen, Graham & 
Schuster, 2003), and increases in societal distrust (Bao, 2017). 
Delinquency, including index offenses (e.g., assault, theft, illicit drug use) and status 
offenses (e.g., alcohol use, truancy) as well as institutional/school punishments (as measured by 
suspensions, expulsions) are often considered precursors to persistent criminality (Hirschfield, 
P.J., 2008; Moffitt & Caspi, 2001). Furthermore, life-course persistent offenders – that is 
offenders who start committing delinquent acts in childhood and adolescence and continue 
throughout the life-span - place an exorbitant financial burden on society. When accounting for 
financial costs to the victims, courtroom proceedings, wages lost to both victims and offenders, 
and intervention (psychosocial, educational, and medical) costs, a single life-course persistent 
criminal has been estimated to cost anywhere from $1,140,000 (Delisi & Gatling, 2003) to 
$4,000,000 (Cohen & Piquero, 2009; Cohen, Piquero & Jennings, 2010), estimates which do not 
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even consider the often-lasting emotional toll of victimization (Juvonen, Graham, & Schuster, 
2003).  
If the costs associated with juvenile delinquency are restricted, such as how problematic 
are these behaviors within a particular community without considering life-course effects, 
estimates are still disturbingly high. For example, school districts in California lose over $276 
million dollars a year in allocated funds due to absenteeism driven primarily by students feeling 
the school environment is unsafe (Baams, Talmage, & Russell, 2017). Given that many states 
allocate school funding as a function of attendance, the cost of absenteeism tied to juvenile 
delinquency (or fear of it) is staggering. Other analyses have focused on the cost of suspensions, 
expulsions, and their tendency to produce drop-outs in the student body (Phillips, 2012). For 
example, using national averages for the prevalence of absenteeism, suspensions, expulsions, 
drop-outs, remedial educational placements, and property destruction, the average high school 
comprised of 1,000 students loses approximately $2,314,600 dollars annually in resources that 
could be applied to educational reforms and improvements (Phillips, 2012).  
When discussing costs, these obviously extend beyond financial terms (e.g. they 
represent pain and trauma and dysfunction stemming from victimization). Being victimized in 
youth has been linked with long-lasting deleterious consequences, such as increased rates of 
social distress (Juvonen, Graham, & Schuster, 2003; Eisenberg, Neumark-Sztainer, & Perry, 
2003), mood and anxiety symptomatology (Copeland, Wolke, Angold & Costello, 2013), and 
suicidality (Klomek, Marrocco, Kleinman, Schonfeld, & Gould, 2007). Adults who report having 
been bullied in their school-age years are twice as likely to attempt suicide compared with their 
non-bullied counterparts (Meltzer, Vostanis, Ford, Bebbington, & Dennis, 2011), even when 
controlling for confounding variables like life-satisfaction. Even if suicidality is not considered, 
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increased levels of mood and anxiety disorders are often observed in adulthood from those 
victimized as children. These effects tend to be long-lasting, as those victimized report 
significantly higher rates of psychopathology, even in the presence of protective factors like 
intact social networks and familial support (Olweus, 1993). Equally troubling is that most of the 
burden is foisted upon the individual (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde & Hankin, 2004), often without 
institutional support (Fattori, et al., 2015). Many require some form of institutional assistance to 
deal with victimization, a cost many schools, families, individuals and organizations may not be 
able to afford or provide (Bechtoldt & Schmidt, 2010). 
This highlights what should be considered a moral imperative about understanding 
juvenile delinquency, identifying when it is occurring and treating both those who are suffering 
from and engaging in it effectively and compassionately. The costs borne by those victimized is 
enormous and long-lasting and those who end up identified as delinquent often have difficulties 
adjusting their behavior in a more prosocial fashion (Phillips, 2012). Therefore, providing 
additional insights into explaining why populations most at risk of turning into life-course 
persistent criminals may stray from prosocial behaviors has enormous social potential. 
 In spite of the many downsides associated with adolescent delinquency – and what it 
portends in the future – it has been highlighted that neuroscientific explorations into many 
psychological problems have failed to translate into improved treatment efficacy (Miller, 2010). 
Explaining this tension between societal necessity and relative lack of efficacy requires 
researchers to examine how we have addressed the problem in the past, as well as identify paths 
forward which may lead to more productive avenues of research. While preliminary in scope, I 
posit that two main issues have plagued the field and have made synthesis of current research 
problematic. First, examinations into affective development have relied heavily on normative 
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samples - at the expense of harder to recruit but necessary delinquent samples – making it 
difficult to know if the processes that go awry are population general or population specific 
(Nelson et al., 2016). Second, the findings that we rely on “to explain delinquency” heavily rely 
on work done on extreme externalizing populations. Focusing on externalizing syndromes is 
problematic, as delinquency is also linked with internalizing conditions. A Procrustean solution 
of focusing on externalizing populations may have limited our true understanding of those who 
engage in acts of misconduct. To address each of these issues, I will synthesize findings from 
these two research bases, as well highlight ways to better span the divide they have created. 
 Both animal and human developmental research has consistently identified a process of 
neural reorganization during adolescence (Mills, Lalonde, Clasen, Giedd & Blakemore, 201402; 
Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005), where there is significant structural and functional 
growth in affective regions of the brain at the expense of regulatory circuitry (Casey et al., 2016; 
Breiner et al., 2018). Theoretically, many have posited such neural changes occur so the 
individual can better understand and overcome the obstacles they will be presented with in 
adulthood (Sato et al, 2008; Blakemore & Robbins, 2012; Crone & Dahl, 2012), as correctly 
processing the emotional components of social behavior are integral to understanding the 
hierarchy cues and being socially successful (Wieser & Brosch, 2012). For example, if an 
individual has a supraordinate goal of making friends, attracting potential mates, and establishing 
themselves in their social hierarchy, it is imperative they identify opportunities where certain 
types of risk-taking behaviors are likely to be beneficial. The focus on identifying rewarding 
affective cues and acting on them has been explored experimentally in a number of studies, 
highlighting that adolescents are unduly sensitive and prone to disinhibition in the presence of 
appetitive social cues (Perino, Miernicki & Teler, 2016; Somerville et al., 2011).  
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This has led some to suggest that acts of adolescent behavior that ventures towards the 
delinquent may be in response to appetitive social cues or the potential for positive social 
advancement (Steinberg, 2007; Casey et al., 2017). The increased focus on these appetitive 
social cues may also coincidentally put adolescents at greater risk of making sub-optimal 
decisions given the right (or perhaps better stated as wrong) context (Cohen et al., 2016; Rudolph 
et al., 2017). One noted limitation of these studies is that by focusing on “normative” 
development, there is a lack of inclusion of the very sample researchers are seeking to 
characterize, specifically delinquent adolescents. While normative patterns of neurodevelopment 
certainly can be helpful for answering some questions, it is not entirely clear that the same 
processes guiding community adolescents towards disinhibited behaviors are the same for 
delinquent adolescents. To answer this question, a research base of comparative studies 
examining community and delinquent adolescents must be accumulated, something not actively 
being done in the field.  
In fact, psychological inquiries looking specifically at populations committing delinquent 
acts often do not select based on “delinquency” but rather on externalizing disorders or 
syndromes sometimes correlated with delinquency – of which there are many (e.g. conduct 
disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, psychopathy; 
Sharp, 2012). Externalizing symptomatology impacts brain regions implicated in a variety of 
psychological processes. Regions often focused on include those implicated in i) reward 
processing, such as aberrant activation of the ventral striatum to rewards (Schneider et al., 2012); 
ii) threat processing, such as amygdala hypoactivation to threatening faces (Coker-Appiah, 
White, Clanton, Yang, Martin & Blair, 2013; iii) empathic processing, as measured by 
hypoactivation in regions implicated in socio-moral processing of affective states recognition 
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(Marsh & Blair, 2008) and pain/distress cues in others. Taken together, the literature suggests 
that rather than being fixated on rewards, externalizing youth may show generally reduced 
physiological responsivity towards socio-affective cues (Blair, Veroude & Buitelaar, 2016).  
The reduced physiological response towards socio-affective cues has been primarily used 
as evidence that aggression and delinquency are the end-result of dysfunction or incompetence in 
the developmental and clinical literature (e.g. Vachon, Lynam, & Johnson, 2014). Many 
researchers began studying moralization as a function of an empathy system (Kochanska, 1993). 
If the “proper” response to viewing the emotional cues of others lead them on the path towards 
moral behavior, it was reasoned that those acting immorally must have deficits in empathy 
(Hogan, 1973; Miller & Eisenberg, 1998). Coined empathic deficits, this reduced physiological 
responsivity to the suffering of others has routinely been interpreted as a missing inhibitory 
component to productive social behaviors (Frick, Blair, & Castellanos, 2013). Mechanistically, 
since acts that harm others are likely to lead the harmed to evince responses of pain, fear, 
sadness, and anger, recognition of such cues by an aggressor should induce an aversive affective 
response and thus lead to more prosocial acts in the future. Given that offenders seem not to 
show this pattern, the assumption is that their empathic system is mechanistically dysfunctional 
and explanatory of their behavioral choices. 
While dysfunction accounts are common in the literature (Bjorklund & Hawley, 2014), 
there are reasons to be skeptical. The reliance on inferences from externalizing populations to a 
global understanding of delinquency is likely unnecessarily limiting the scope of scientific 
inquiry. A number of findings should highlight this point: a) there are not accepted models in the 
field for defining violence (Barratt & Slaughter, 1996), so while we tend to use externalizing as 
shorthand for delinquency, the disorders and behaviors encompassed are very broad; b) other 
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mental illnesses not generally thought of within the externalizing spectrum (e.g. depression, 
anxiety disorder, panic disorder) have been linked with violence in meta-analyses (Oram, 
Trevillion, Khalifeh, Feder, & Howard, 2013); and finally c) when considering factors that 
predict future recidivism (i.e. continued delinquency), the best predictors are not psychological 
diagnosis but age and previous delinquency (Dressel & Farid, 2018) – a finding that had been 
confirmed in past meta-analyses (Gendrau, Little, Goggin, 1996; Hanson & Bussiere, 1998). 
Given that much of understanding of the neuroscience of delinquency stems from conditions 
associated with delinquency rather than delinquency in and of itself is problematic, as past acts 
of delinquency are often more predictive of future misconduct than psychological variables 
(Dressel & Farid, 2018). In other words, what we know about “delinquency” or “violence” is 
often based on a very skewed perspective (one gleaned almost exclusively from work on 
externalizing syndromes) that may not account for delinquency or violence as syndromes onto 
themselves (Vachon, Lynam & Johnson, 2014).  
Unanswered questions and wrenches thrown 
As highlighted above, the current neuroscience base has essentially examined the 
problem of delinquency from two distinct pathways – as an unfortunate result of normative 
developmental processes or as stemming from dysfunction. Normative neurodevelopment 
accounts suggest that adolescents show increased neural responsivity to affective stimuli. While 
this change may be in response to an increased need to read the social environment and act 
without restriction when opportunities for advancement present themselves, this increased 
responsivity to affective cues may lead to risky, even delinquent behaviors. However, while this 
finding has been shown across a number of empirical studies, the lack of delinquent samples 
included in these studies leaves the connection between emotion processing and delinquency as 
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somewhat theoretical, at least in application to the populations most likely to be identified as 
delinquent.  
In order to establish that affective disruption is tied to delinquent adolescent behavior, we 
need to show that community adolescents – those without behavioral histories of delinquency - 
and delinquent adolescents – those with confirmable acts requiring institutional involvement – do 
not show differential behavioral or neural patterns in response to emotional cues. It is plausible 
that delinquent adolescents have problems with affective cues like their community counterparts, 
just in greater quantity and frequency, which would indicate that affective development is fairly 
universal and delinquent behaviors may be driven by deficiencies elsewhere (e.g. regulatory 
regions). However, it is also plausible that affective difficulties are more specialized; that is, the 
affective difficulties of delinquent and non-delinquent adolescents are qualitatively different. To 
test this, I will comparatively examine adolescent emotion processing in both delinquent and 
community adolescent samples to see how behavioral disinhibition may be differentially 
impacted (Study 1). Ultimately, given that delinquency is transdiagnostic and the best predictor 
of future delinquency is past delinquency, assessing how the attentional pull of socioaffective 
cues affects delinquent and community samples comparatively may be of great utility.  
Delinquency as incompetence or dysfunction accounts have largely relied on findings 
from psychopathological populations, which have generally shown deficiencies in measures of 
physiological responsivity to socioaffective cues. These findings have led some to state that the 
violent acts of delinquent individuals may be tied to an inability to read socioaffective cues 
(Blair, 1997; Blair, 2005). However, a growing body of evidence has found that while 
physiological reactivity may be reduced in regards to affective stimuli in psychopathic 
individuals for basic recognition tasks, the ability to understand, identify, and encode this social 
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information may be more intact if the information is either relevant to an antisocial goal they 
may have (Book, Quinsey, & Langford, 2007) or if their attention is explicitly directed towards 
the socioaffective cues (Glass & Newman, 2006). Furthermore, inherent in the logic of 
delinquency as dysfunction arguments is that prosociality should be considered an expected 
outcome and that aggressive responses stem from incompetence – something that has not been 
universally accepted (Bjorklund & Hawley, 2014) but has largely guided the developmental 
literature (Ellis et al., 2012).  
A growing number of studies on humans show that individuals engaged in higher rates of 
aggression coincidentally have a number of positive developmental outcomes (Rose, Swenson, 
& Waller, 2004; Hawley, Little, & Card, 2007; Juvonen, Graham & Schuster, 2003), including 
reduced negative affect to distress in others (Blair, Jones, Clark, & Smith, 1997; Hicks & Patrick, 
2006). There exist many studies highlighting how some delinquent teens have intact – if not 
superior - social intelligence (Kaukianen et al., 1999), high social status (Rodkin, Farmer, Pearl 
& Van Acker, 2006; Thunfors & Cornell, 2008), and are generally regarded as leaders within 
their social environment (Rose, Swenson & Waller, 2004; Vaillancourt, Hymel, & McDougall 
2003). This research highlighting the positives that can come from delinquent behavior tends to 
not view such acts as stemming from broken biological systems; instead, this work posits 
delinquent behaviors may represent a pattern or social strategy, often triggered in response to 
perceived chaos in the environment (Figueredo & Jacobs, 2010),  resource-depleted 
environments (Ellis & Bjorklund, 2012; Wang, Kruger, & Wilke, 2009) or early-life stressors 
(Ellis & Bjorklund, 2012; Ellis, Figueredo, Brumback, & Schlomer, 2009). In such 
environments, the ability to dissuade others from attacks or maintain one’s status may hinge on 
one’s ability to recognize social cues in others, all while establishing, monitoring and 
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maintaining social reputations (Cairns, Cairns, Neckerman, Gest, & Gariepy, 1988; Chan et al., 
2016; Espelage, Bosworth & Simon, 2000; Luthar & McMahon, 1996) . 
Perhaps, this is not due to inability, but strategy. Of course, this is somewhat theoretical, 
given the lack of neuroscientific research examining the beneficial aspects of delinquency, as 
most inquiries continue to view antisocial acts as pathology (Fonagy & Luyten, 2017). One 
theoretical framework – in line with the normative developmental research - that may provide 
some guidance in bridging this divide is the social information processing (SIP) model (Dodge, 
1986), which examines how cues are processed to guide behavior. Social competence is likely 
demonstrated by processing social cues in the environment in an automatic (perhaps even 
unconscious) fashion, and then knowing how to turn this information into a useful social act 
(Dodge, 1986). This framework has more recently been adapted to explain irregularities in how 
delinquent youth may interpret social dynamics (Mize & Pettit, 2008).  
Given that behavioral acts likely represent something unique about the individual’s 
perception of their social environment – even if they happen to lack conscious awareness and 
insight into these perceptions (Philippi & Koenigs, 2014) – individuals engaging in delinquent 
acts may be scanning and interpreting socioaffective cues in such a way that reflect their 
underlying motivations. This highlights the need to examine how individuals engaging in 
specific delinquent acts process social interactions, as this may allow us confirmation that they 
are processing cues along supraordinate goals. Given that most dysfunction theories posit the 
etiology of delinquency stems from breakdowns in perceptual processing instead of problematic 
supraordinate goals (e.g. positive views towards antisocial actions), focusing on how antisocial 
behavioral patterns and motivations impact social information processing is integral to providing 
clarity and considering treatment options.  
 11 
While the normative developmental literature has generally found that adolescent neural 
responsivity to affective cues tends to be directed towards those that are appetitive, delinquent 
youths engaging in specific acts of aggression may be using the same underlying process 
(increased attentional focus and neural processing of socioaffective stimuli) to focus on cues that 
buttress antisocial acts. This approach has been adopted in many forensic assessments of 
criminal behaviors, where attempts to explain delinquent acts via interpersonal narratives of 
actively delinquent individuals has proven useful (Youngs & Canter, 2012). While the link 
between any given psychological factor and any specific behavioral outcome is relatively weak, 
narrowing the focus to samples actively engaged in rare events with shared psychological 
variables has proven more fruitful (Canter & Youngs, 2009). Specifically, an individuals’ 
reporting of their own antisocial behavioral patterns and explanations of antisocial interpersonal 
interaction are often quite predictive of future offending (Presser, 2009), and may often predict 
who desists from future delinquency and who is likely to recidivate (Maruna, 2001). The key to 
such research has been argued to be specificity – it isn’t worthwhile to examine antisocial 
motivations in populations not being actively antisocial; however, examining specific 
motivations for specific acts may be particularly fruitful. 
To assess the theory of top-down attentional processing of cues relevant to antisocial 
actions in adolescents, I will examine how behavioral and neural responses in a series of social 
neuroscience paradigms correspond to motivational theories of delinquency. In Study 2, I will 
examine if bullying – a behavioral profile often found in delinquent adolescents and thought to 
reflect intentional aggression – may serve as a top-down attentional mechanism that focuses 
neural processing to social exploitation. In Study 3, I will examine how delinquent adolescents 
use social information to aggress (or not aggress) against confederates who have portrayed 
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themselves as (and been treated by others as) either victims and [other] bullies. Of note, I will 
examine if the delinquent adolescents are sensitive to differences in a) character (interacting with 
someone who has been acting like a bully compared to interacting with someone who has been 
victimized), and b) situational cue (i.e., being aware of the consequences of their actions). Both 
character and situational cues represent important social cues necessary for appropriate 
behavioral responses. If delinquent adolescents are sensitive to such cues (even in the event that 
they lack insight to this sensitivity), they should show behavioral differences as a function of 
these cues. Importantly, in Study 3, I will investigate whether certain individual difference 
factors (namely psychopathy and sadism) are particularly important in identifying socioaffective 
cues. Both of these personality traits have been consistently linked with proactive aggression, 
highlighting a need to determine if the aggression associated with each is due to generally higher 




CHAPTER 2: EMOTION REGULATION DIFFICULTIES 
Adolescence is often described as a paradoxical time, where relative improvements in 
certain domains (e.g., abstract reasoning) are often coupled with suboptimal decision-making in 
other domains (e.g., increased risk-taking; Nelson et al., 2005). Much of this paradox has been 
attributed to the outsized role that affective processing plays in adolescents’ lives (Somerville, 
Hare & Casey, 2011). Specifically, adolescents’ ability to regulate their behavior seems 
particularly affected by socioaffective cues at this stage (Chein et al., 2011; Casey et al., 2015), 
which may explain the onset of negative outcomes like psychopathology (Kranzler et al., 2016), 
increased risk taking (Casey, Jones, & Hare, 2008; Guyer et al., 2012; Nelson et al., 2005; 
Pfeifer et al., 2012; Perino, Miernicki, & Telzer, 2016; Somerville et al., 2011), and rises in 
delinquency (Moffitt & Caspi, 2001). Developmental neuroscience research has found such 
suboptimal behavioral outcomes are driven, in part, by neural changes. For example, volumetric 
gains in social cognition regions (e.g., the fusiform face area (FFA), superior temporal sulcus 
(STS), and temporoparietal junction (TPJ); Blakemore and Mills, 2014) and increases in neural 
activation of affective circuitry (e.g., amygdala (Guyer et al., 2008), ventral striatum (Galvan, 
2010)), have been observed. These neural changes are proposed to reorient cognitive resources 
towards salient socioaffective cues and away from regulatory processing (Nelson et al., 2005; 
Nelson et al., 2016; Somerville et al, 2011, Perino et al, 2016) which may explain observed 
increases in reckless and delinquent behavior.  
While such work has aided in theorizing how neuroscience can inform the treatment of 
adolescents engaging in high rates of disruptive behaviors (Cohen & Casey, 2014; Casey et al., 
2017), it is unclear if these normative increases are explanatory for individuals already engaging 
in destructive behaviors. Given the relative nascence of the field, there have been few 
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examinations comparing normative from non-normative samples, leaving many of our 
suppositions surrounding affective development, and difficulties attached to affective processing, 
relatively theoretical (Nelson et al., 2016). To better understand how affective processing 
difficulties may lead adolescents astray, more inquiries need to focus on how, when and for 
whom affective stimuli is likely to prove problematic.  
Increased dysregulation in response to appetitive cues among normatively developing 
teens may theoretically help them fulfill fundamental needs, such as allowing them to act when 
opportunities arise that can establish or increase their status within their social hierarchies 
(Nelson et al., 2016). However, increased dysregulation in threatening circumstances may also 
be beneficial, as it may allow an individual to respond quickly in a threatening environment 
(Cairns et al., 1988; Meijers et al., 2018). Put more simply, while social reorientation 
theoretically guides adolescents to focus on what is important in their social world, there is wide 
variability in what comprises an individual’s social world and what should be most important.  
For those at the greatest risk for delinquency, they are often subjected to significantly more 
environmentally disruptive factors than other community members (Agnew, 1992). This begs 
one to ask the question of whether the socioaffective cues relevant to those engaging in 
delinquency may fundamentally differ from their community counterparts.  
Little is known about how the social reorientation may vary as a function of life 
experiences or other individual difference factors. Given that adolescence is a time of relative 
goal flexibility where differential goals influence neural processing and habit-learning behaviors 
(Crone & Dahl, 2012), those actively engaged in delinquency may show distinct behavioral and 
neural patterns relative to non-offending adolescents. One way to assess this is to examine how 
neural regions implicated in cognitive control are recruited by adolescents when regulating 
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behaviors across different socioaffective contexts. Recruitment of prefrontal regions (mPFC, 
dlPFC, IFG) are implicated in executive function tasks and are impaired in the presence of 
socioaffective cues among adolescents (Nelson et al., 2016). For instance, the inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG) is particularly important for successful inhibition in the presence of salient stimuli 
(Aron et al., 2014; Sharp et al., 2010; Swann et al., 2012; Serences et al., 2005), playing a key 
role in the ability to successfully focus on the task at hand and away from distracting salient 
information in the visual field (Fukada & Vogel, 2009). Importantly, the IFG is widely 
implicated in developmental neuroscience literature as being integral to regulating adolescent 
risk taking (McCormick & Telzer, 2017; McCormick, Qu, & Telzer, 2016) and psychopathology 
(Fowler, Miernicki, Rudolph, & Telzer, 2017). 
Current Study 
In the current study, I assessed how the presence of appetitive and aversive socio-
affective cues differentially impact inhibitory and neural responses on an implicit emotion 
regulation task using a community sample (recruited via local, traditional schools) and a 
delinquent sample (recruited within the same geographic area but primarily selected based on 
having had disciplinary contact with school (e.g. suspensions and expulsions) and legal 
institutions (e.g. arrests), as the presence of such events in adolescence have been linked with 
continued criminal behavior (Rocque & Paternoster, 2011; Wald & Losen, 2003; Weiner, 2003). 
To recruit this population, I worked with a local (a) alternative school for students expelled from 
traditional schooling, (b) the local parole & probation office, and (c) the local juvenile detention 
center. The emotion regulation task used was a modified go-nogo paradigm, where participants 
were instructed to inhibit a prepotent behavioral response while distracted by socio-affective 
cues, which were either socially appetitive or aversive stimuli. This task was previously used to 
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assess emotion dysregulation in a community sample (Perino et al., 2016), which found evidence 
of adolescent emotion-dysregulation towards affective stimuli broadly, with particularly strong 
behavioral decrements in response to appetitive relative to aversive stimuli. It is not clear 
whether this same pattern would be found in a population adapting to a more negative 
environment. For example, it is plausible that social reorientation may impact all adolescents 
along a continuum, such that perhaps delinquent adolescents are quantitatively more 
emotionally-dysregulated than their non-offending community counterparts in the presence of 
socially appetitive cues. Alternatively, rather than showing quantitatively greater dysregulation 
to the same cues, delinquent adolescents’ dysregulation may be qualitatively different. In other 
words, adolescents with behavioral issues may have adapted to their environment in such a 
fashion that a social reorientation directs attention to cues more relevant, such as cues of threat or 
those that evoke aversive affective states. Thus, the process of social reorientation is universal, in 
that attentional resources at this developmental stage are disproportionately directed towards 
socioaffective cues in the environment (Nelson et al., 2016), but which cues are salient may 
differ based on behavioral profile, which may provide valuable insight into regulatory 
differences between those undergoing normative development and those actively engaged in 
socially problematic behaviors.   
As stimuli acquire value via association, they are likely to exert top-down effects on 
attentional resources (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011). What is valuable within a given 
environment will vary. Because of this, I suggest that appetitive cues may be more salient for 
normative affective development, as processing these cues may provide adolescents 
opportunities to understand and engage in their social world. However, for adolescents who 
engage in highly disruptive behaviors, processing aversive cues, which may signify oncoming 
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threat, may be more action-provoking and important. Given that the value of socioaffective cues 
are likely related to an individual’s behavior (Foulkes & Blakemore, 2018), I hypothesize that (1) 
socioaffective cues will lead to greater recruitment of attentional resources (Theeuwes, 2010) 
which will lead to disruption; 2) however, the nature of the disruption will likely depend on the 
behavioral profiles (community, delinquent) of the adolescents.  
Methods 
Participants 
 Forty-eight adolescents participated in the current study. The community sample included 
24 participants (Mage = 15.8 years, SD = 0.36, 12 females), and self-reported ethnicity were 
collected (Caucasian=71%; African-American=12.5%, Asian=12.5%, Hispanic = 4%), The 
delinquent sample included 24 participants (Mage = 16.2 years, SD = 1.2), with equal ethnic 
representation (see Table 2.1 for demographic breakdown of both samples). To recruit 
participants engaging in antisocial behaviors warranting institutional involvement (e.g., property 
theft, fighting, drug use and/or sale, weapon use, etc.), I recruited from (i) an alternative school 
for students who have been expelled or suspended from traditional schools for acts of gross 
misconduct, (ii), the local juvenile detention center, (iii), and the local parole and probation 
office. To provide greater clarity regarding the scope of delinquency and institutional discipline, 
number of suspensions, expulsions, and arrests were collected in the delinquent sample (see 
Table 2.2). Participants in the community sample were recruited from traditional schools in the 
same geographic area. Participants were compensated $50 (USD). Informed consent and assent 
were obtained for participants in accordance with the University’s Institutional Review Board. 
Experimental Paradigm: Go-Nogo and Social Go-Nogo Task 
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While completing an fMRI scan, participants completed both a control go-nogo, which 
was used solely to establish baseline cognitive performance in the absence of socioaffective cues, 
and a social go-nogo task (Perino et al., 2016), which was used to assess emotion-dysregulation 
provoked by differential socioaffective cues. Utilizing a control go-nogo is optimal for 
establishing baseline rates of inhibitory control. However, given the goal of examining how 
socioaffective cues may have distinct effects on emotion-regulation in these samples, neural 
analyses for the current manuscript solely focus on differentiating neural patterns in the social 
go-nogo.  
The control go-nogo consisted of 4 blocks, each containing 25 trials. The control task was 
completed prior to the social go-nogo, which included 4 aversive and 4 affective blocks, which 
were presented in a randomized order. Participants were presented with blocks of socially 
appetitive or aversive scenes for 300ms, after which a letter was superimposed on the image for 
500 ms. During this 500ms window, participants were instructed to respond as quickly as 
possible by pushing a button for every letter shown (“go”) except the letter “X” (“nogo”). The 
control go-nogo task was identical in design structure, but did not include superimposed images 
(rather, a white square would be presented on a black screen for 300ms, after which a black letter 
was superimposed on the white background for 500ms. In both task variants, 28% of the trials 
were no-go trials, which created a prepotent response to press, requiring inhibition on nogo trials. 
A jittered ITI was presented between trials, averaging 1200ms. In total, the social go-nogo 
consisted of 8 randomized blocks (4 blocks each of socially aversive scenes and socially 
appetitive scenes), each block containing 25 trials. Socially appetitive blocks included scenes of 
people celebrating, cooperating, and being affiliative, while socially aversive blocks included 
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scenes of people excluding one another, bullying peers, and showing negative affect (see Perino 
et al., 2016 for selection and reliability of the stimuli).  
I used d’ as my behavioral measure of emotion regulation (Cohen et al., 2016). d’ is an 
index originating from signal detection theory in which the normalized rate of correct 
discrimination of a signal (‘hits’) is compared to the normalized rate of false attributions of 
signal due to noise (‘false alarms’) (Green & Swets, 1966; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). In this 
experiment, a ‘hit’ was defined as every time the participant made a button press when 
appropriately required to, and a false alarm was defined as every instance the participant pressed 
the button when inappropriate to do so (i.e., during presentation of an X). d’ was calculated by 
subtracting normalized false alarm rates from normalized hit rates (d’ = ZHit – ZFalse Alarm).  d’ was 
calculated separately for socially appetitive and socially aversive blocks as well as the baseline 
control task.  
fMRI Data Acquisition 
 Imaging data were collected with a 3 Tesla Siemens TRI MRI Scanner. T2* weighted, 
matched-bandwidth (MBW), high resolution anatomical scan (TR=4sec; TE=64ms; FOV=230; 
matrix=192x192; slice thickness=3mm; 38 slices) and T1* magnetization-prepared rapid-
acquisition gradient echo (MPRAGE; TR=1.9sec; TE=2.3ms; FOV=230; matrix=256x256; 
sagittal plane; slice thickness=1mm; 192 slices) scans were acquired as structural images. Each 
condition of the experimental paradigm was comprised of 120 T2-weighted echoplanar images 
(EPI; slick thickness=3mm, 38 slices; TR=2sec; matrix=92x92; FOV=230mm; voxel size of 
3x3x3 mm). An oblique axial orientation was used to maximized coverage area and reduce 
signal dropout for the T2 images.  
fMRI Data Preprocessing and Analysis 
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 Data preprocessing and analysis were conducted using Statistical Parametric Mapping 
(SPM8; Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College, London, UK). Functional 
images were spatially realigned in order to correct for movement (no participant exceeded 3mm 
of maximum image to image motion in any direction for more than 5% of their echoplanar 
images). The images were coregistered to each participant’s high-resolution MPRAGE and 
segmented into cerebrospinal fluid, gray matter, and white matter. A normalization 
transformation matrix was applied to the functional and T2 structural images, thereby converting 
each participant’s data into the standard stereotactic space specified by the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI). Normalized functional data were smoothed using an 8mm 
Gaussian kernel (full-width-at-half maximum). A restricted maximum likelihood algorithm, with 
an autoregressive model order of 1, was used to address serial autocorrelations, and a high pass 
filter with a 128-sec cutoff was applied to remove low-frequency noise.   
 Data were analyzed using the General Linear Model (GLM). At the individual level, a 
fixed-effects analysis was modeled with a block design, in which all individual trials were 
modeled within each block (800 ms duration) for each condition (socially appetitive, socially 
aversive) so that null events (i.e., jittered ITIs) served as the implicit baseline. To model 
inhibitory processing, a parametric modulator (PM) in each participants’ first level model for the 
conditions of interest (appetitive or aversive socioaffective cues) was created to represent 
behavioral accuracy. The PM isolates neural responses linked to behavioral performance on the 
task (e.g. successful inhibition relative to failed inhibition), allowing us to identify regions 
specifically recruited for successful behavioral performance. By segregating neural regions that 
show a parametric contrast between successful and unsuccessful trials, rather than to some 
variance related to other task components, I can assess if the same regions are impacting 
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behavior equivalently in each group, or if divergent neural profiles – i.e. greater recruitment of a 
region by one group or within one condition – separates behavioral outcomes. I represented 
successful completion of an individual trial, such that 1 = correct response (correct hit or “go” 
and correct inhibition or “nogo”) and 0 = incorrect response (incorrect hit or “false alarm” and 
not responding on go trials “miss”). Significant voxels represent brain regions that show 
parametrically greater activation to correct versus incorrect trials based on the given condition of 
interest (socially appetitive or socially aversive).  
Parameter estimates from the GLM were used to create linear contrasts for comparisons 
of interest (socially appetitive>socially aversive) at the group level. Random effects, whole-brain 
analyses were conducted in order to examine group differences between delinquent and 
community adolescents. To correct for multiple comparisons at the group level, I conducted a 
Monte Carlo simulation using the AFNI software package’s 3dClustSim command for the group-
level brain mask (Ward, 2000), and corrected for intrinsic smoothing, which was estimated using 
the 3dFWHMx command and acf. Results of the simulation indicated that a Family Wise Error 
(FWE) corrected rate of p<.05 would be achieved with a voxel-wise threshold of p<.005 and a 
minimum cluster size of 132 voxels. All analyses controlled for ethnicity, as I modeled self-




To examine behavioral differences between the community and delinquent samples, I 
conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with one within-subject variable (socioaffective 
condition: control, appetitive, aversive) and one between-subject variable (group: community, 
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delinquent), using self-reported ethnicity as covariates to control for race-based effects. A 
significant main effect of condition (F (2, 43) =5.187, p=.007), a marginally significant main 
effect of group (F (1,44) =4.042, p=.051), and a significant group X condition interaction (F 
(2,43) =22.959, p<.001) was observed. To explore this interaction, I ran post hoc t-tests and 
found that whereas the community sample showed significantly poorer performance in the 
socially appetitive condition relative to the baseline control (t (23) =4.18, p<.001) and aversive (t 
(23) =2.08, p<.05) conditions, the delinquent sample showed the opposite pattern; specifically, 
performance in the appetitive condition was significantly better compared to both the baseline 
control (t (23) =3.75, p=.001) and aversive (t (23) =9.477, p<.001) conditions. These results 
suggest inhibitory failures were related to differences in behavioral profile (delinquent, 
community) and cue-type (appetitive, aversive) (see Figure 2.1). These findings suggest a 
qualitative difference in emotion-regulation difficulties, rather than linear differences with 
delinquent youth showing the same disruption but at quantitatively higher levels. 
Neuroimaging Results 
 Given that both behavioral profile and cue type produced a significant interaction effect 
on behavioral disruption – and that exploring this interaction illuminates how community and 
delinquent processing of emotion may differentially impact behaviors -  I next examined regions 
tied to successful task completion between groups. I conducted a two-sample (delinquent vs. 
community) whole-brain t-test comparing neural activation on the main contrast of interest 
(socially appetitive cues>socially aversive cues), using the parametric modulator for successful 
task completion, relative to task failures. I observed significant group differences in the left IFG, 
medial prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction/angular gyrus, precuneus, and 
midbrain/brainstem (see Table 2.3 for full results). 
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Given the connection of the IFG to behavioral inhibition, I extracted parameter estimates 
from this cluster to unpack how this region differentiated inhibitory failures as a function of 
group status. As shown in Figure 2.2, delinquent adolescents showed greater recruitment of the 
IFG during successful inhibition towards socially aversive cues compared to community 
adolescents who showed greater recruitment of the IFG during successful inhibition towards 
socially appetitive cues, suggesting that recruitment of this region promoted successful task 
performance during the cue type where each group showed the most regulatory failures. This 
suggest that the IFG is crucial for successfully inhibiting behavior in the presence of socio-
affective cues; however, IFG recruitment is not uniformly observed for all socioaffective cues 
but depends on the types of cues which impact emotion-regulation for each group. In other 
words, each sample is showing greater recruitment of this region to successfully inhibit during 
the cue type they struggle with most, suggesting greater recruitment does not imply better 
performance but does imply greater need to inhibit attentional resources away from distracting 
affective cues.  
Discussion 
Adolescence is a transitory period, where social information takes on great import for 
achieving age-specific goals (Nelson et al., 2016). The increased focus on socioaffective 
information guides attention towards cues that may signify a window of opportunity for 
adolescents to rise socially (Crone & Dahl, 2012). However, these opportunities for social 
advancement may also bear increased risk, and when neural reactivity is coupled with poor 
regulation, suboptimal outcomes may result (Casey, 2015). Previous research examining the 
effects of socioemotional stimuli on adolescents has shown that appetitive cues (Perino et al., 
2016, Somerville et al., 2011) are linked with dysregulation at the behavioral and neural level. I 
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assessed if delinquent adolescents respond to socioaffective cues in a quantitatively different (i.e. 
do they simply show more emotion dysregulation to the same cues than non-offending 
adolescents?) or qualitatively different (i.e. do they simply show different emotion dysregulation 
depending on the socioaffective context?). I found that difficulties in emotion-regulation were 
qualitatively different between the delinquent and community sample, as community adolescents 
showed greater difficulties in the context of appetitive social cues whereas delinquent 
adolescents showed greater difficulties in the context of aversive social cues.  
Examining brain regions that differentiated success from failure showed that recruitment 
of the IFG distinguished the groups. Delinquent adolescents recruited this region to successfully 
inhibit their responses specifically in the presence of aversive cues, whereas the community 
sample recruited the IFG recruitment when successfully inhibiting their responses specifically in 
the presence of appetitive cues. While clear that the IFG was involved in successful emotion 
regulation, the conditions that provoked greater regulatory processing was contingent upon group 
status, as emotion regulatory processing failures were specific to the cues that created the most 
difficulties at the behavioral level.  
Adolescents with a history of behavioral misconduct may be particularly prone to 
suboptimal behavioral choices in the presence of aversive cues (e.g. signifying threat), while 
their non-offending counterparts may be particularly attuned to appetitive cues (e.g. signifying 
social acceptance). This suggests that rather than simply being deficient at emotion regulation in 
a global sense, delinquent adolescents have an aberrant response potentially linked to their prior 
behavior and understanding of their social world. If an adolescent is generally undergoing a 
normative developmental process, it may be expected that focusing on appetitive social cues of 
others is beneficial and also more likely to be present in the environment. However, for 
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adolescents engaging in antisocial behaviors, an ability to identify, process, and act without 
hesitation in the presence of aversive cues may be more important.  
 This study provides a novel contribution, both in employing a nuanced approach to 
understanding emotion regulation difficulties of adolescents and in providing a comparison of 
emotion-regulation difficulties between a community and delinquent sample of adolescents. As 
the field of developmental neuroscience progresses, the need to apply our findings to real-world 
social problems becomes more obvious (Casey et al., 2016). In order to have empirically based 
findings best inform potential interventions aimed at addressing social problems, it is imperative 
that we base our results on samples actively engaged in the problems we want to tackle (e.g., 
delinquency). While this study represents an important step towards understanding how 
individual difference factors need to be accounted for in developmental neuroscience (Foulkes & 
Blakemore, 2018), there are limitations which require future attention. First, because I used a 
cross-sectional design, I am unable to explore the progression of emotion dysregulation in 
delinquent adolescents, and whether or not their aberrant pattern of regulatory failures stems 
from learned experience (Agnew, 1992) or is already present and contributes to delinquent 
behavior. Future research should examine emotion regulation difficulties across the lifespan, 
with a focus on both prospective and retrospective analyses that tie neural development to 
meaningful behavioral differences. Second, while the distinction between adolescents who 
offend and those who do not has been shown to be quite meaningful (Cohen & Piquero, 2009; 
Moffitt & Caspi, 2001), this assessment is somewhat blunt. Future work should address a wide 
array of individual difference factors, as variations in social motivation, perceptual processing, 
and lived experience are theorized to explain much of when and why adolescents focus on 
socioaffective stimuli (Nelson et al., 2016). 
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 These results help to shed light on the mechanisms required for successful emotion 
regulation in adolescents, as well as provide a nuanced account of how prior behavior impacts 
when and why adolescents may engage in suboptimal decision-making. The cues that lead 
adolescents without prior histories of delinquency astray may not be comparable to those already 
engaging in criminal acts, and vice versa. By highlighting that emotion regulation difficulties 
across different adolescents are specific to both behavioral history and social context, I hope to 
inform theories surrounding how to best understand and ultimately intervene upon problematic 
adolescent outcomes. This study provides a useful comparative analysis, showing that emotion 
regulation failures seen across adolescence require a nuanced approach, as community 
adolescents’ emotion regulation difficulties may be qualitatively different from delinquent 
adolescents. This has clear implications for intervention research: understanding that different 
factors may account for similar acts of delinquency may provide clues into how emotion 
regulation interventions need to be tailored towards the individual. This study suggests that a 




TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 2.1: Demographic information for both community and delinquent 
 
 Community sample (n=24) Delinquent Sample (n=24) 
M age 15.8 yrs (SD=.36) 16.2 yrs (SD=1.2) 
% female 50% 50% 
White N=17 N=12 
Black N=3 N=12 
Other N=4 N=0 
 
 
Table 2.2: Disciplinary history of delinquent sample 
 
 Number of times disciplinary act occurred  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+ 
Suspensions 8.3% 16.7% 25% 0% 4.2% 0% 0% 41.7% 
Expulsions 41.7% 12.5% 4.2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 





Table 2.3: Neural regions which differentiate group X condition performance  
  
 
Region BA    x   y   z    t   k 
      
IFG 45 L -42 35 -2 4.62 234 a 
Mid Orbital Gyrus 46 L -24 29 -11 3.60 a 
vmPFC 11 R 12 44 -20 4.22 294 b 
vmPFC 11 L -9 50 -20 3.62 b 
Brainstem  L -3 -13 -17 5.18 288 
Precuneus 7 L -3 -70 34 4.94 503 
Angular Gyrus / TPJ 39 L -45 -67 28 4.13 239 
 
Note. R refers to right and L refers to left. x, y, and z refer to MNI coordinates; t refers to the t-
score at those coordinates (local maxima); IFG refers to inferior frontal gyrus; vmPFC refers to 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex; TPJ refers to temporal parietal junction. Regions that share the 















CHAPTER 3: NEURAL ACCOUNT OF BULLYING 
 
Given the results of study 1, which suggest that delinquent youth process emotional 
information differently (though not necessarily deficiently) than their community counterparts, it 
is important to explore further emotional processing capabilities of delinquent adolescents 
specifically as they relate to delinquent behaviors. As demonstrated, assuming that insights from 
normative development align with specific suboptimal outcomes may not translate to delinquent 
youth. Furthermore, given the theoretical limitations that have guided neuroscience, examining 
additional perspectives may prove beneficial. Given the societal desire for understanding 
bullying, and how it may be reduced, examining these tendencies within a delinquent sample 
where aggression is already elevated is a good starting place to test hypotheses about the top-
down impact of antisocial tendencies and motivations. 
Introduction 
 Bullying is widely regarded as a ubiquitous feature of the schooling experience (Berger, 
2007; Book, Volk, & Hosker, 2012; Volk et al., 2012). Approximately one out of every five high 
school students reports being bullied within the last calendar year (Gladden et al., 2013), with a 
smaller proportion of middle and high-school students reporting that their experience with 
bullying is a constant struggle (Robers et al., 2010). Coupled with this all too common 
experience are often highly grievous, long-lasting consequences such as increased rates of social 
distress (Juvonen, Graham, & Schuster, 2003; Eisenberg, Neumark-Sztainer, & Perry, 2003), 
mood and anxiety disorder symptomology (Copeland et al., 2013), and suicidality (Klomek et al., 
2007).  Under this backdrop, it may not be surprising to find that much of the neuroscientific 
research has focused on the victims, rather than the perpetrators, of bullying and social exclusion 
(MacDonald & Jensen-Campbell, 2011; Masten & Eisenberger, 2009; Sebastian et al., 2011; 
 32 
Vaillancourt, Hymel, & MDougall, 2011; Vaillancourt, Hymel, & McDougall, 2013; 
Vijayakumar, Cheng, & Pfeifer, 2017). While this framework may be understandable, focusing 
on the end-result of bullying, rather than the commission of destructive behavior and 
psychological processing of the perpetrators, has limited the scope to which neuroscience 
informs our understanding of bullying to theoretical suppositions (Viding et al., 2011). In order 
to provide useful insight for understanding and combating bullying, direct focus need be placed 
on applying theory to specific neural hypotheses (Krakauer et al., 2017), which I aim to address 
in the current study by examining how bullies view social exploitation relative to egalitarian 
behaviors. 
Bullying can be understood as a specific type of aggressive interpersonal act, where 
harmful behaviors are often intentional and power imbalances are exploited and repeated over 
time through the use of physical, verbal, psychological or written threat or force (Center for 
Disease Control [CDC], 2016; Olweus, 2003). While there has been ample work studying the 
aberrant neural processing of child, adolescent, and adult populations linked with aggression - 
for instance, those with conduct disorder or psychopathic traits (Blair, Veroude, & Buitelaar, 
2016; Fairchild et al., 2013; Marsh et al., 2013; Michalska, Zeffiro, & Decety, 2016), there are a 
number of concerns which limit the utility of applying such research to everyday acts of bullying 
in adolescents. First, there are reasons to assume that issues of sample inconsistencies and 
measurement invariance within the aggression literature poses problems for generalization to 
bullying behaviors, as distinct theories explaining phenomenon linked to aggression, such as 
psychopathy, have led to large variations in assessment even within diagnostic category (Edens 
et al., 2015; Rodman et al., 2016; Venables & Patrick, 2012). Second, it can hardly be stated that 
delinquency (generally) or bullying (specifically) is solely the purview of those with conduct 
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disorder or psychopathic traits (Hawley, Stump, & Ratliff, 2011). Bullying may best be 
described as a dynamic social strategy, where individuals must read and understand social 
hierarchies and interpersonal cues (Hawley, 2003). Because of this, trying to glean results solely 
based on clinical diagnosis may unnecessarily limit findings to those with unrelated comorbid 
problems. Trying to explain acts of bullying – a very specific type of aggressive act – to general 
knowledge about psychopathy, where the behavioral presentation is often quite varied (Hare, 
Forth, & Strachan, 1992), may not provide the level of specificity needed. Third, and perhaps 
most importantly, there is a dearth of research examining bullying using social paradigms, 
which, in part, may be due to a theoretical reliance on viewing bullying and other aggressive acts 
as stemming from dysfunction and pathology (Blair, 2016), rather than as a dynamic social 
strategy (Bjorklund & Hawley, 2014). There has been at least one recent attempt to provide 
paradigms that may identify bullying behavioral patterns (Mancilla-Caceras, Espelage, & Amir, 
2015), but these have not been widely disseminated or adapted for fMRI use. 
Empirical work examining bullying as an alternative strategy for navigating social 
environments has provided some interesting work suggesting the potential utility of such a 
behavioral profile (Book, Volk, & Hosker, 2012; Farrell et al., 2014; Volk, Dane, & Marini, 
2014; Volk et al., 2016). In some contexts, an individual’s use of aggression may successfully 
allow them to procure and maintain status and resources (Bjorklund & Hawley, 2014). Three 
main lines of research support such a stance: First, ethologists have long noted that aggressive 
behaviors akin to bullying, where aggression is utilized for the sake of instrumental gain or 
advantage at the expense of others, are pervasive in the animal kingdom (Alcock, 1989; Masure 
& Allee, 1934), including species closely related to humans, such as great apes (Goodall, 1986; 
Pederson, King, & Landau, 2005). Second, recent empirical work has tied developmental 
 34 
stressors – such as neglect or trauma – to both aberrant neurodevelopment of affective processing 
regions and adolescent delinquency (Caldwell et al., 2015). Such an account suggests that 
bullying may be a developmental variant of a risky life-strategy (Figueredo & Jacobs, 2010), 
perhaps triggered by an early perceptional awareness of their social environment as chaotic or 
resource-depleted (Ellis & Bjorklund, 2012) that leads to neurodevelopmental changes 
promoting aggressive behaviors. Finally, there has been a growing number of studies showing 
that adolescents who engage in higher rates of aggression coincidentally have a number of 
positive developmental outcomes, such as higher rates of popularity (Rose, Swenson, & Waller, 
2004) and social status (Hawley, Little, & Card, 2007; Juvonen et al., 2003), intact social 
intelligence (Kaukianen et al., 1999), greater resistance to negative emotional states (Hicks & 
Patrick, 2006), and generally reduced levels of anxiety (Deeley et al., 2006). Adolescent peers 
often nominate bullies as “leaders” in their social environments (Vaillancourt, Hymel, & 
McDougall, 2003), a result found in normative adult samples as well (Maner, 2017). Together, 
this research suggests that bullying is not specific to humans, can be triggered as a means of 
surviving harsh environments, and often has situationally beneficial outcomes for those who 
employ it as a social strategy – suggesting approaches viewing bullying as “pathological” may be 
problematic. 
There have been calls to explore antisocial behaviors in ways that also account for these 
beneficial outcomes (Ellis et al., 2012), with a growing acceptance that understanding the 
development of antisociality within context requires more specificity (Dodge & Albert, 2012). 
Spurred by these discussions, recent neuroscientific inquiries of developmental aggression have 
acknowledged the heterogeneity of pathways to and outcomes stemming from delinquency 
(Fonagy & Luyten, 2017); despite these advances, there has been significantly less 
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neuroscientific inquiry focusing on the social information processing of bullying in adolescents. 
To address this lacuna, I utilized functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in a sample of 
delinquent adolescents to examine how the endorsement of bullying would be neurally 
represented while observing individuals being bullied during a game predicated on social 
cooperation (Cyberball: Jarvis & Williams, 2006). While bullying can likely be studied as a 
normative process (Hawley, 2003), particularly given how it has been studied in successful adult 
populations (Maner, 2017), I chose to focus on delinquent adolescents, as bullying behaviors are 
prevalent in such populations (Bender & Losel, 2011), highly predictive of future criminality 
(Moffitt & Caspi, 2001), and extremely costly and debilitating to schools (Phillips, 2012; Baams, 
Talmage, & Russell, 2017).  
Given bullying’s unique connection with aggression for personal benefit (Hawley, 2011), 
and recent findings that not all forms of aggression can be linked with neurophysiological 
dysfunction (Gao & Raine, 2010; Raine et al., 2011), I aimed to study if individuals engaging in 
higher rates of bullying would view instances of social exclusion with heightened neural 
processing in areas of motivation and salience. If bullying serves as a  behavioral strategy for 
navigating social environments, I may see hyperactivation in regions implicated in motivation, 
such as the ventral striatum (Zink et al., 2003) and amygdala (Cunningham & Brosch, 2012), 
social perception, such as the medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction (Mills et al., 
2014), or salience monitoring (Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011), like the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC: Menon & Uddin, 2010) and ventral tegmental area (VTA: Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, 
& Hikosaka, 2010). I hypothesized that such findings would be consistent with an interpretation 
of bullying as a top-down strategy relaying attentional resources to effectively process social 
dynamics and relationships (Dodge, 1986). By placing bullying within a recognizable social 
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context, I can assess if bullying may fit with a motivated cognition or processing (Dunning, 
1999) account where greater recruitment of perceptional resources for cues relevant to an 
individual’s goals would be required (Gantman & Van Bavel, 2015).  
Methods and Materials 
Participants 
Twenty-four adolescents (12 female; age 13.1 to 17.7 years M = 16.2 years, SD = 1.2; 
50% African American, 50% European American) with a history of severe behavioral conduct 
problems were recruited from a town in Midwestern United States to participate in a 
neuroimaging study. I targeted individuals who had recently engaged in delinquent behaviors 
that warranted school or legal intervention, including targeted bullying, threatening and 
intimidation of others, initiating physical fights, using weapons, stealing, and/or drug-use. 
Participants were recruited through a number of sources, including 1) an alternative school 
consisting of students who have been multiply suspended or expelled from traditional schooling 
for acts of gross misconduct, 2) the local juvenile detention center, and 3) the local parole and 
probation office. Based on self-reports, fourteen participants reported at least one previous 
expulsion from school, twenty-three reported at least one suspension from school, and twelve 
reported being arrested at least once (see Table 3.1). The University’s Institutional Review Board 
approved all study procedures and participants and caregivers provided written assent and 
consent, respectively. Adolescents were compensated $50 for their participation. 
Procedure 
Experimental Task 
Prior to their scan, participants completed a personal profile to “introduce” themselves to 
other individuals they may interact with during the scan task. Each profile consisted of the 
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participant’s photo, their first name, as well as four traits that they, their friends, their family 
members, or teachers would use to describe them (see Figure 3.1). After completing their own 
profile, participants were introduced to eight other players who they were told were also 
completing a scan visit and playing the same games (see Figure 3.1). In reality, the other players 
were confederates. Participants viewed the eight profiles and were instructed to do their best to 
remember each individual, as they may interact with them in an upcoming game. Given that the 
goal was to create a social scenario where participants would observe bullying, the other players 
were created to fit into social schemas related to individuals who may bully, who may be 
victims, and who were neutral. Four of the confederates were described with neutral traits, e.g., 
“steady,” “casual”; two were described with victim traits, e.g., “shy,” “nerdy”; and two were 
described with bully traits, e.g., “competitive,” “demanding.” Traits for each category were 
chosen from a broader pool of 140 traits which were normed by 38 individuals (21 female; Mage 
= 23.55 years) who were asked to rate the extent to which each item embodied bullies or victims 
(1 = “Victim trait”, 4 = “Neutral or neither trait”, 7 = “Bully trait”). Bully traits selected were 
those that received a mean rating of 5.5 or greater, and victim traits were those that received a 
mean rating of 2.5 or lower. Each bully and victim confederate was matched to be the same 
gender and ethnicity as the participant, with neutral profiles being gender-congruent but also 
including both ethnically congruent and incongruent partners (see Figure 3.1). Profile photos 
were pulled from google image searches and other available photo databases containing photos 
of teenagers and young adults (Stanley et al., 2016). 
After viewing the profiles, participants were instructed on how to play Cyberball, a 
frequently utilized experimental paradigm used to simulate social inclusion and exclusion where 
participants are required to throw a ball to one another, though not necessarily in an egalitarian 
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fashion (Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011; Williams & Jarvis, 2006). After learning the 
rules, each participant was assigned to play a self-paced round with two of the neutral 
confederates, who were programmed to be egalitarian. Participants could see the photographs of 
the other two players on a computer screen as well as their own ‘hand’ that they controlled using 
one of two buttons to indicate who they wanted to throw the ball to. Across 48 ball-tosses, the 
participant was equally included. Participants were instructed that the other six players had also 
been randomly assigned into two groups of three players who would be playing Cyberball.  
During the fMRI scan, participants were told they would be observing the two rounds of 
Cyberball that the other 6 players had completed during the pre-scan session. They were first 
shown a screen with the profiles of the three players they would be observing, and then they 
passively viewed the Cyberball games that were identical in length and number of throws to the 
pre-scan game they played. Each round contained one confederate with bully traits, one with 
victim traits, and one neutral player. One of the rounds depicted social exclusion, where the bully 
confederate was preprogrammed to exclude the victim confederate while the neutral confederate 
sparingly threw the ball to the victim (only four times during the entire interaction). A second 
round depicted social inclusion during which the three players threw the ball to each other 
equally (see Figure 3.1). Run order of the exclusion/inclusion rounds was randomized between 
participants to reduce any effect of expectation violation.  
Illinois Bully Scale  
Participants completed the University of Illinois Bully Scale (IBS) to assess frequency of 
targeted aggressive behaviors (Espelage & Holt, 2001). The types of bullying behaviors assessed 
by the 9-item scale included social exclusion, rumor spreading, name-calling, and unprovoked 
aggression. Participants were asked to indicate along a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “Never,” to 5 = 
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“7 or more times”) the number of times they have engaged in bullying behaviors over the past 30 
days. Example items include “I upset other students for the fun of it,” and “I spread rumors about 
other students” Higher scores indicate a greater number of bullying behaviors (α = 0.94). 
Importantly, the Bully Scale is theoretically distinct from Bully-Victim categorizations, 
distinguishing those who generally bully without histories of past victimization. 
fMRI Data Acquisition 
Neuroimaging data were collected utilizing a 3 Tesla Siemens Trio MRI scanner. My 
adapted Cyberball paradigm included T2*-weighted echoplanar images (EPI; slice thickness = 3 
mm; 38 slices; TR=2s; TE=25ms; 92 x 92 matrix; FOV=230 mm; 2.5 x 2.5 x 3mm3 voxel size). 
The structural scans consisted of a T2*weighted, high resolution, matched-bandwidth (MBW) 
anatomical scan (TR = 4s; TE = 64ms; FOV = 230; 192 x 192 matrix; slice thickness = 3 mm; 38 
slices) and a T1* magnetization-prepared rapid-acquisition gradient echo (MPRAGE; TR = 1.9s; 
TE = 2.3ms; FOV = 230; 256 x 256 matrix; sagittal plane; slice thickness = 1mm; 192 slices). 
The orientation of the MBW and EPI scans were set to be oblique axial in order to maximize 
brain coverage and reduce signal dropout. 
fMRI Data Processing & Analysis  
Statistical Parametric Mapping was used to process and analyze the neuroimaging data 
(SPM8; Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). In 
order to correct for head motion, spatial realignment was conducted during preprocessing of 
images. Realigned functional data were then coregistered to the high resolution MPRAGE 
image. The MPRAGE was segmented into cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), gray matter, and white 
matter. The normalization transformation matrix from the segmentation step was then applied to 
the functional and T2 structural images in order to transform them into standard stereotactic 
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space as defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute and the International Consortium for 
Brain Mapping. An 8mm Gaussian kernel, full-width-at-half maximum, was used to smooth the 
functional data, increasing signal-to-noise ratio. Each round of Cyberball was convolved with the 
canonical hemodynamic response function. High-pass temporal filtering with a cutoff of 128s 
was applied to remove low-frequency drift in the time-series. A restricted maximum likelihood 
algorithm was used to estimate serial autocorrelations with an autoregressive model order of 1. 
At the individual level, a fixed-effects analysis was modeled as a block design (social 
exclusion, social inclusion). The parameter estimates from the GLM were used to create linear 
contrast images comparing each of the conditions of interest at the group level. Random effects, 
whole brain analyses were conducted using GLMFlex to examine group effects of condition type 
on neural activation (http://mrtools.mgh.harvard.edu/index.php/GLM_Flex). Additionally, I 
conducted whole-brain regression analyses in which I regressed each participant’s Bully Scale 
(mean score) onto the contrast of interest (exclusion-inclusion).  
To correct for multiple comparisons, I conducted a Monte Carlo simulation using 
3dClustSim while estimating smoothness with the 3dFWHMx function in the AFNI software 
package (Ward, 2000). Results of the 3dClustSim indicated a voxel-wise threshold of p<.005 
combined with a minimum cluster size of 76 contiguous voxels for the whole-brain analysis, 
corresponding to p<.05 FWE corrected. 
Results 
I first conducted whole-brain t-tests, comparing the contrast social exclusion > social 
inclusion. I did not find any significant patterns of activation to this contrast or to social 
inclusion > social exclusion. Next, I examined how adolescents’ endorsement of bullying 
behaviors correlated with neural activation during social exclusion > social inclusion. To this 
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end, I ran whole-brain regression analyses in which I regressed bullying scores onto neural 
activation during the social exclusion > social inclusion conditions. I found several significant 
clusters, with one large cluster connecting bilateral amygdala, ventral striatum, and insula and 
another including medial prefrontal cortex. As shown in Figure 3.2, as individuals engaged in 
more bullying behaviors, activation in these regions increased when viewing social exclusion 
relative to inclusion (see Table 3.2 for full results).  
Discussion 
I examined delinquent youths’ neural processing while observing peers being excluded, 
with a particular focus on how self-reported endorsement of bullying related to neural activation 
patterns when observing others being bullied. By employing a passive viewing paradigm of 
social cooperation and social exclusion, I tested how a top-down motivational account (i.e., 
bullying serving as a social strategy) would relate to neural activation. I found that as participants 
endorsed higher rates of bullying, they demonstrated increased activation in the ventral striatum, 
amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex, and insula while viewing social exclusion relative to 
inclusion. Activation in these regions, commonly associated with reward-learning, salience 
monitoring, and motivational processes, provides evidence that bullies are aberrantly – though 
not deficiently – processing interpersonal cues and social dynamic experiences in their 
environment. Recent accounts view the amygdala less as a region solely for processing affective 
resonance (Marsh et al., 2014) but for processing motivationally relevant stimuli more generally 
(Cunningham & Brosch, 2012; Ernst, Pine, & Hardin, 2006; Stillman, Van Bavel, & 
Cunningham, 2015). Additionally, the ventral striatum is linked with reward processing 
(Knutson et al., 2001) and more comprehensive accounts consider both of these regions as part 
of the same general network that functionally identifies salient information in one’s environment 
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(Stillman et al., 2015; Zink et al., 2003). This suggests that perhaps rather than being unable to 
process socioaffective cues, bullies may actually process the socioaffective cues in further depth, 
so long as doing so would align with their supraordinate goals.  
This finding runs counter to what much of the past research has found with aggressive 
populations, where hypoactivation (usually of the amygdala) and lack of responsivity to 
socioaffective cues are commonly found (Blair et al., 2016; Marsh, 2016). The presumed 
inability of aggressive individuals to recognize social and affective cues has been thought to be 
key in explaining the commission and maintenance of aggressive behaviors. Theoretically, it has 
been argued that the unsuccessful processing of socioaffective cues may lead to failed inhibition 
of aggressive behaviors in the face of distress cues. However, a number of recent empirical 
findings challenge this mechanistic account, focusing on the role that attention and motivation 
may play. Specifically aggressive personality traits may focus attentional resources towards goal-
relevant social cues, like physical cues indicating past victimization (Book, Costello, Camilleri, 
2013; Denardo-Roney, Falkenbach, & Aveson, 2018; Ritchie, Blais, Forth & Book, 2018; 
Wheeler, Book & Costello, 2009), personal descriptions of oneself as vulnerable (Wilson, 
Demetrioff, & Porter, 2008) and verbal cues of dominance (Book, Quinsey, & Langford, 2007).  
Physiological hyporesponsivity, historically interpreted as empathic deficits (Blair, 
2005), may actually have conflated empathic ability with social concern or motivational goals. 
For example, a recent fMRI study in adults examined neural responsivity when viewing others in 
pain in both a control and psychopathic offender population, and found that without any prompts, 
the psychopathic sample tended to show reduced neural reactivity in pain-processing regions 
(Meffert, Gazzola, den Boer, Bartels & Keyser, 2013). However, when the same participants 
were instructed to feel with the actors being hurt, the neural hyposensitivity was attenuated 
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(Meffert, Gazzola, den Boer, Bartels, & Keyser, 2013), suggesting that there was not an inability 
to neurally process the pain but rather an unwillingness or lack of automaticity to process the 
pain of others. This may suggest hyporesponsivity to socioaffective cues may reflect attentional 
direction to avoid processing these cues in certain contexts, rather than a general inability to 
perceive socioaffective cues. Accounts relying on hypoactivation of affective regions in 
aggression may be conflating lack of empathic response with mismatched motivations. If an 
empathic response is counter to a person’s social strategy, I theorize one would expect relative 
hypoactivation in affective regions when processing social information – particularly if these 
social cues are divorced from meaningful social context. However, when social cues are 
presented in a context more aligned with an individual’s goals, motivational and salience 
circuitry is more likely to be recruited. Because I placed the viewing of an aggressive act 
(exclusion) within social context (by a self-identified bully to someone self-identifying with 
traits linked with submissiveness and vulnerability), I hypothesized that salience and affective 
motivational circuitry would be recruited, as activation in these regions would indicate 
motivational processing aligned with the worldview of a bully (Sharp, Carolyn, & Fonagy, 
2011).  
The assumption that youth engaging in higher rates of bullying are unaware of the 
negative consequences of their aggressive actions may be inaccurate, and that empathic deficits 
may need to factor in motivational factors. Recent work has suggested that lacking an affectively 
concordant response – e.g., seeing another’s sadness makes an individual feel sad – is not nearly 
as predictive of aggression as is having an affectively dissonant response – e.g., taking pleasure 
in others’ pain or expressing displeasure when seeing others’ happiness (Vachon & Lynam, 
2016). These findings support the notion that motivated antisocial behavior, such as bullying, 
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might be better understood as a top-down strategy that focuses attention to cues and situations 
where dominant strategies and recognition of social hierarchy cues may be adaptive. Indeed, a 
recent meta-analysis revealed there is surprisingly little evidence to suggest that current “gold-
standard” measures of empathy show a demonstrable link with aggression (Vachon, Lynam, & 
Johnson, 2014), which is likely driven by an over-reliance on clinical samples to inform theories 
of aggression rather than focusing on aggression broadly (Rai, Valdesolo, & Graham, 2017; 
Fiske & Rai, 2014). Coupled with the limited empirical evidence showing that changes in 
empathy are sizable, stable, or predictive over time of lower recidivism or physical aggression 
(Day, Casey, & Gerace, 2010; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2005), the need for incorporating 
new and complementary approaches to explaining and treating aggression, in all its forms, is 
paramount. I suggest a motivated cognition account (Dunning, 1999) of aggression may be at 
play, where cues necessary for the successful implementation of one’s interpersonal strategies 
are scanned for in the environment.  
Because this task involved passive viewing and does not have a behavioral component, I 
am not able to directly measure if their processing of the social cues of bullying would be used 
by these same individuals in future interactions (e.g., if their neural processing of the current 
exploitation would inform future behavioral decisions with said actors). What I was able to test is 
how situational cues of exploitation are being neurally processed; however, what comes of such 
neural processing is an open question and an area of research in need of direct follow-up. Being 
neurally responsive may not correspond to conscious awareness (Philippi & Koenigs, 2014), and 
how said neural activation in response to passively viewing social interactions guides future 
behavior is unclear. One potential avenue for future inquiries is how social processing accounts 
of aggression may be examined through the use of neuroeconomic games (King-Casas & Chiu, 
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2012), an approach that has not been widely adapted to aggressive adolescent populations 
(Sharp, 2012). It is essential for future researchers to get creative in terms of the paradigms used 
(Espelage & Swearer, 2003), with a clear focus on assessing intentionality and limitations or 
strengths in social information processing (Mancilla-Caceres, Espelage & Amir, 2015). I suggest 
that social neuroscience is well-placed to address these issues, so interventions can be tailored 
with the greatest empirical backing and the most efficacious outcomes can be promoted 
(Cuthbert & Insel, 2010; Insel et al., 2010).  
Given the evidence that empathy based interventions may not have long lasting or 
meaningful positive effects on recidivism and offender behavior (Merrell et al.,  2008; Yeager et 
al., 2015), the continued focus on empathy training is problematic (Vachon & Lynam, 2016). In 
the case of aggressors, a cottage industry of interventions focused on improving the empathic 
capacity of aggressors (Fruzzetti & Levensky, 2000; Goldstein, Glick, & Gibbs, 1998; Grossman 
et al., 1997; Marshall, 1999; Ross & Ross, 1995). While empathic dysfunction is a logical 
starting point to examine the etiology of aggression, my study employs a different tact, making 
the processing of social dynamic information highly salient and potentially aligned with their 
own stated interpersonal strategies. New approaches for understanding social behavior should be 
explored, as social neuroscience paradigms provide the opportunity to provide explore 
interactions between individual differences and social context factors that underlie problematic 
behaviors  (Insel et al., 2010; Tavares et al., 2015). These results add to a body of literature 
suggesting bullying may best be understood as the end result of a societally undesirable – but 
perhaps effective - interpersonal strategy, rather than emotional and perceptual processing errors 
of affect at the level of the individual. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 3.1: Percent of sample engaging in disciplinary acts (N=24) 
 
 Number of times disciplinary act occurred  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+ 
Suspensions 8.3% 16.7% 25% 0% 4.2% 0% 0% 41.7% 
Expulsions 41.7% 12.5% 4.2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 









Region BA    x   y   z    t   k 
Positive Correlation with Bullying      
IFG 47 R  33  23 -14 5.75  1424a 
VS  L   -9    8 -11 3.69    a 
VS  R    9    8   -8 3.43   a 
Insula  L -36  14    1 3.53    a 
Insula  R  45    8   -2 3.08    a 
Amygdala  R  21    2  -23 3.77   a 
Fusiform 37 R  30 -25 -29 3.61   197 
Precentral Gyrus 4   L -39 -28  67 5.27  213 
Precuneus 7 R  12  70  58 5.12  163 
MPFC 9/10 L   -9  62    4 5.10  248 
Precentral Gyrus 4 R  36 -13  55 4.81  217 
PCC 31 L   -6 -25  55 4.56  135 
 
Negative Correlation with Bullying     
Fusiform 37 R  17 -65 -10 3.01    578 
Mid Occipital Cortex 18 R  21 -97  10 3.33  145 
Cuneus      0 -88  28 5.10  226b 
Mid Occipital Cortex 18 L -15 -97  10 2.93    b 
Note. R refers to right and L refers to left. x, y, and z refer to MNI coordinates; t refers to the t-
score at those coordinates (local maxima); IFG refers to inferior frontal gyrus; VS refers to 
ventral striatum; VLPFC refers to ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; ACC refers to anterior 
cingulate cortex; PHG refers to parahippocampal gyrus; MPFC refers to medial prefrontal 
cortex; MFG refers to middle frontal gyrus; ITG refers to inferior temporal gyrus; PCC refers to 
posterior cingulate cortex; MOG refers to middle occipital gyrus; IOG refers to inferior occipital 




Figure 3.1: Profiles of participants (a) and confederates (b), as well as randomly presented 













































Figure 3.2:. Greater endorsement of bullying behaviors is associated with greater activation 
during social exclusion > social inclusion in the ventral striatum, insula, amygdala, and medial 
prefrontal cortex. Parameter estimates of signal intensity were extracted from the entire cluster 
encompassing the striatum, insula, and amygdala, and plotted with adolescents’ self-reported 











































CHAPTER 4: ANTISOCIAL MOTIVATIONS AND AGGRESSION 
 
Results from Study 1 suggest that delinquent populations process emotional information 
differently than their community counterparts; furthermore, results from Study 2 suggest 
antisocial motivations (namely, bullying behavioral tendencies) may potentially serve a top-
down role that focuses the attentional resources of bullying delinquents towards cues relevant to 
social exploitation. Given that Study 2 was not a behavioral task, we have cautioned against 
strong interpretation of such a result without further verification that said redirection of 
attentional processing corresponds to real-world outcomes. To provide such evidence, Study 3 
was designed to examine how a sample of delinquent adolescents use previously encoded 
socioaffective cues (such as character type (bully vs victim)) and situational cues (contingencies 
which may arise as a result of aggression) to guide behavioral choices, if they use them at all. 
While activation of salience networks in Study 2 suggest that bullies processed a socially 
dynamic interaction, it is unclear if such a neural sensitivity will correspond to using that 
information to guide social decision making.  
Introduction 
 Neuroscientific examinations of aggressive populations – child, adolescent, and adult 
alike – have largely focused on deficiencies in affective processing systems which may account 
for destructive social behaviors (Blair, 2005). These accounts routinely find that aggressive 
individuals often show hyporesponsivity to distress cues in others (Blair, 2007), both 
behaviorally and physiologically. This pattern is thought to reflect an empathic deficit, as 
empathically appropriate responses ought to show some physiological arousal that is then 
connected with emotional concern, and inhibits antisocial behaviors (Blair et al, 1997). Such 
theoretical accounts have largely guided neuroscientific research into aggression, with the 
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assumption that socioaffective cues are generally not read – or misread – by those engaging in 
violent acts, leading to increases in aggression.   
However, an alternative interpretation of such findings is that the difficulty is not at the 
level of reading socioaffective cues but rather at the motivational level (Fiske & Rai, 2014), as 
some individuals may have antisocial motivations that impact processing at the level of 
interpretation of distress cues. In other words, for individuals with interpersonal goals that err 
towards the malevolent – either as a function of temperament or situational context – 
socioaffective processing may be impacted. Given that empathy is driven by both ability and 
motivation (Zaki, 2014), if someone lacks the motivation to view an individual in a 
compassionate light, we may expect to see reduced responsivity (Rai et al., 2017) without 
speaking to empathic ability.  Taking this theorem further, if the presence of distress cues are 
seen as rewarding (i.e. having been conditioned towards some appetitive outcome) one might 
actually expect physiological responsivity normally associated with empathic processing to 
appear aberrant (Zeigler-Hill & Vonk, 2015), particularly if those cues align with an individual’s 
social processing strategy (Mize & Pettit, 2008).  
Aggressive individuals seeming lack of focus on and responsivity to distress cues (Moul 
et al., 2012) may not be due to inability or dysfunction but rather not wanting to hinder other 
goals, such as gaining resources in the environment (Patterson & Newman, 1993). Therefore, 
when social cues of distress are presented without social context (Marsh et al., 2014) or without 
attention being directed towards them (Meffert et al., 2013), aggressive individuals are likely to 
show hypoactive responses due to lack of context. However, if attention is directed towards the 
cues (Meffert et al., 2013) or if the social cues are aligned with an offenders’ motivational 
approach (Study 2), neural responsivity in neural circuitry implicated in salience monitoring – 
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key in terms of processing cues relevant to motivational goals - may be recruited (Lamm et al, 
2011) in a top-down fashion (Stillman et al., 2015). 
While suggestive of a top-down motivational understanding of social-information 
processing in offending populations, neither of the two aforementioned studies (Meffert et al., 
2013; Study 2) included behavioral measures. That is, neural responsivity in salience networks 
was not tied directly to a later behavioral preference or choice. This leaves theoretical 
suppositions about selective neural processing of goal-relevant cues somewhat speculative. To 
examine aggression through a motivational framework, paradigms need to be implemented 
where cues relevant to particular social goals may be processed in antisocial individuals in a way 
that directly tests top-down processing effects. For example, understanding that violence is 
heterogeneous and that certain acts may be more top-down than others allow one to test 
hypotheses surrounding required attentional awareness of cues for goal-oriented behavior. A 
particularly strong candidate demonstrating the potential utility of a social-information 
processing account for explaining aggressive behavior may be present in examining individuals 
who commonly use aggression as a “justified” social strategy (Youngs & Canter, 2012), such as 
those who engage in proactive – or unprovoked – aggression (Raine et al., 2006).  
While much of the work examining reactive aggression has noted its affectively 
dysregulated nature, examinations of proactive aggression note such events are not particularly 
emotional for offenders (that is, not the result of dysregulation) and often serve as a means to a 
desired end (Raine et al., 2006; Dodge & Coie, 1987). Given the focus on proactive aggression 
serving clear utilitarian purpose, paradigms designed to assess the recognition and utilization of 
cues to guide behavior may help answer questions of how top-down processing may be 
implicated in aggressive acts. Research into proactive aggression has routinely implicated two 
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personality traits above all others – psychopathy and sadism – as clearly linked with unprovoked 
aggression (Reidy et al., 2011).  
Psychopathy is a personality construct, that is often assessed in forensic populations 
given its link to antisocial behavior (Hare, 1993). The relationship of psychopathy to 
instrumental aggression is well documented, with some authors suggesting that psychopathic 
offenders’ criminal actions may be, at least in part, in response to the processing of social 
dominance cues of others in their environment. For example, an examination using a community 
sample revealed psychopathic personality was related to selectively focusing on personal 
descriptors of vulnerability at the expense of all others in an implicit memory task (Wilson, 
Demetrioff, & Porter, 2008). Additionally, elevations of psychopathic traits, both in community 
(Wheeler, Book, & Costello, 2009) and incarcerated samples (Book, Costello, & Camilleri, 
2013), have been correlated with increased success in identifying victimization histories in others 
simply by watching how individuals walked. These findings have replicated in recent, larger 
samples, suggesting the links between psychopathy and assessments of vulnerability may be 
stable (Denardo-Roney, Falkenbach, & Aveson, 2018; Ritchie, Blais, Forth, & Book, 2018), 
though it is interesting to note these follow-ups have implicated different facets of psychopathy. 
Sadism is a personality construct that measures one’s tendency to enjoy and derive 
pleasure from committing cruel acts upon others (Balakrishnan, Plouffe, & Saklofske, 2017; 
Buckels, Jones, & Paulhus, 2013; Buckels & Paulhus, 2013; Buckels, Trapnell & Paulhus, 2014; 
Paulhus, Curtis & Jones, 2018). Sadism is linked to a slew of deleterious behaviors, such as 
preferring violent media (Greitemeyer, 2015) and increasingly seeking it out over time 
(Greitemeyer & Sagioglou, 2017), experiencing joy at the misfortune of others (Buckels et al., 
2013; Schumpe & Lafrenière, 2016), destructive online behaviors like trolling (Buckels et al., 
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2014) and cyberbullying (Sest & March, 2017; van Geel, Goemans, Toprak, & Vedder, 2017), 
traditional bullying behaviors (Chabrol, Van Leeuwen, Rodgers, & Sejourne, 2009; van Geel et 
al., 2017), going out of one’s way to inflict harm on others (Buckels et al., 2013; Pfattheicher & 
Schindler, 2015), and an increased propensity to engage in acts of unprovoked aggression against 
others (Reidy, Zeicher, & Seibert, 2011). Importantly, sadistic acts do not seem to be provoked 
by emotional dysregulation (Zeigler-Hill & Vonk, 2015) but rather by improper emotional 
responding (i.e., elevated reporting of positive emotions towards violent stimuli; Mededovic, 
2017).  
Given the connection of psychopathy and sadism towards proactive aggression – and the 
focus on interpersonal cues required to enact such a strategy – they are ideal candidates to 
examine social information processing accounts of aggression. In addition to being consistently 
linked with proactive aggression (Reidy et al., 2011), these two traits also share other 
distinguishing features making them ideal targets for studying top-down aggression theories. 
Psychopathy and sadism have been identified as key components of the dark tetrad of personality 
traits and share a focus on negative views on others and aggression as a justified act in 
interpersonal interactions (Paulhus et al., 2018). While clinical measurements of psychopathy 
(Hare, 1993) and sadism (Millon, 1981) have skewed towards focusing on behavior, personality 
approaches to assessing psychopathy and sadism have shown similar success in behavior 
prediction (Jones & Paulhus, 2014) while additionally allowing for more direct focus on 
motivations, worldviews, and approaches to interpersonal interactions (Paulhus et al., 2018). 
This focus on motivation seems increasingly important for understanding delinquency, as 
recent work has found that personal narratives (that is, how people see themselves in relationship 
to others) often play outsized roles in both starting and continuing antisocial behaviors (Maruna, 
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2001; Ward, Mann, & Gannon 2007; Presser, 2009). Given that personality assessment 
approaches to dark traits are reasonably in line with predictions from more clinically focused 
approaches, and have the added advantage of highlighting aggressive individuals’ justifications 
for their acts, they may be particularly ripe for studying any potential top-down effects. 
Antisocial motivations may serve individual’s differently or be used to meet differing 
psychological functions and goals. For example, while the aggression often linked to 
psychopathy and sadism is proactive (Paulhus et al., 2018), psychopathy may represent 
opportunistic aggression where offenders aggress in order to get ahead (Paulhus et al., 2014; 
Glenn et al., 2017) while the aggression linked to sadism might reflect aggression aimed at 
diminishing others (Buckels et al., 2013; Paulhus et al., 2018). However, these suppositions of 
how psychopathy and sadism may relate to successfully processing socioaffective interpersonal 
cues are limited, both in sheer number of inquiries and in terms of neuroscientific examination. 
Psychopathy has generally been studied in relationship to psychopathological outcomes (Blair et 
al., 2016). Sadism research is even more scarce, given the relatively nascence of measures 
assessing “everyday” presentations of the trait (Buckels & Paulhus, 2013).  
Current Study 
A main limitation of much of the work examining how antisocial motivations and 
personality traits may impact social information processing is the a) focus on viewing the 
behaviors tied to such conditions as pathological, rather than focusing on their motivational 
justifications or the benefits they may confer, and b) not examining how these traits may impact 
neural processing that guides decision-making. One exception showed that when psychopathic 
offenders were asked to “empathize” with individuals being harmed, that their once “deficient” 
neural response much more closely resembled a normative neural response (Meffert et al., 2014). 
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While such a finding is suggestive that motivation can increase neural processing in salience 
circuitry, this study did not have a follow-up behavioral component, making it difficult to 
ascertain if increased neural responsivity meant greater recognition (or guidance of behavior) in 
any meaningful fashion. To address this weakness, I had participants interact with the individuals 
(e.g. the “bully” and “victim” character) they had observed in the socially exploitive strategy (in 
Study 2), to see if they would use that information to guide future behavior. Specifically, this 
study examines if antisocial motivations (specifically psychopathy and sadism) predict different 
types of aggressive acts, and if this relates to neural activation patterns in regions implicated in 
salience monitoring. Given that many theorize hyporesponsive physiology reflects an inability to 
process cues (Blair, 2005; Marsh et al., 2014), if evidence is found suggesting aggressive 
populations actually do neurally process socioaffective cues to meet certain antisocial ends, then 
that would suggest the deficiency lies in prosocial motivation rather than affective processing. 
Per previous findings (Study 2), I hypothesize that if there are neural activation differences 
relating to antisocial motivation, the regions most likely to be involved are those implicated in 
salience processing, such as the brainstem, pons, basal ganglion structures (e.g. ventral striatum, 
putamen, etc.), the amygdala, and insula. 
Methods and Materials 
Participants 
As described in Study 2, twenty-four adolescents (12 female; age 13.1 to 17.7 years M = 
16.2 years, SD = 1.2; 50% African American, 50% European American) with a history of severe 
behavioral conduct problems were recruited from a town in Midwestern United States to 
participate in a neuroimaging study. Specifically, we focused recruitment on individuals with 
verifiable histories of antisocial behaviors resulting in institutional contact. We targeted 
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individuals who had recently engaged in delinquent behaviors that warranted school or legal 
intervention, including targeted bullying, threatening and intimidation of others, initiating 
physical fights, using weapons, stealing, and/or drug-use. Participants were recruited through a 
number of sources, including 1) an alternative school consisting of students who have been 
multiply suspended or expelled from traditional schooling for acts of gross misconduct, 2) the 
local juvenile detention center, and 3) the local parole and probation office. Based on self-
reports, fourteen participants reported at least one previous expulsion from school, twenty-three 
reported at least one suspension from school, and twelve reported being arrested at least once. 
The University’s Institutional Review Board approved all study procedures and participants and 
caregivers provided written assent and consent, respectively. Study 3 immediately proceeded 
Study 2, and adolescents were compensated $50 for their participation. 
Measures 
Comprehensive Assessment of Sadistic Tendencies (CAST) 
Sadism was assessed with the CAST (Buckels & Paulhus, 2014). This unpublished 18 
item measure has been used to assess “everyday sadism” in nonclinical samples (e.g., 
Balakrishnan, Plouffe, & Saklofske, 2017; Buckels et al., 2014; Greitemeyer, 2015; Russell & 
King, 2017) and is a revised version of an earlier published measure called the Varieties of 
Sadistic Tendencies (VAST: Buckels et al., 2013; Paulhus & Jones, 2015). Example items 
include “I was purposely mean to some people in school,” and “I enjoy physically hurting 
people.” The CAST includes three subscales to measure both direct (verbal and physical) and 
indirect (vicarious) sadism. All items were rated on a 7 point Likert scale, with 1 = strongly 
disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, and 7 = strongly agree (∝= .89). 
Short Dark Triad: Psychopathy (SD3: Psychopathy) 
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Psychopathy was assessed with the SD3: Psychopathy Subscale (Jones & Paulhus, 2014). 
The 9-item measure has been used to assess elevations of psychopathic traits in non-clinical 
samples (Jones & Paulhus, 2014). Example items include, “People who mess with me always 
regret it,” and “Payback needs to be quick and nasty,” The psychopathy subscale is one of three 
scales in the dark triad (the others being Machiavellianism and narcissism) – given our focus on 
unprovoked aggression, these other scales were not analyzed. All items were rated on a 5 point 
Likert scale, with 1=strongly disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, and 5=strongly agree (∝=
.72). 
Behavioral task: Modified Dictator Game 
 Immediately after viewing the Cyberball manipulation described in Study 2, participants 
were told they would complete a “reward game” with some of the players they had just observed. 
In the reward game, they were instructed that they would have to choose how to split up points 
between themselves and a partner, who was one of the individuals in the Cyberball round they 
had previously observed. In reality, the reward game was a modified dictator game, which had 
been designed to assess cooperation (or lack thereof) as a function of both character (i.e., bully 
versus victim) and situational contingencies (i.e., selfish versus vindictive outcomes).  
In a typical dictator game paradigm, the participant serves as “the dictator”, and must 
unilaterally choose how to divide a sum of money or points between themselves and a recipient 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). For example, the participant may be given a sum of 
money (e.g. $10) and told to divide that money however they see fit between themselves and the 
recipient, ranging from keeping all the money for themselves (and giving none to the other 
player) all the way to giving all the money to the other partner (and keeping none for 
themselves). The level of fairness or cooperation by the dictator is assessed by determining if the 
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individual is willing to pass on some positive sum of money - even when they are under no 
constraint to do so or at risk of being sanctioned by the recipient for an unfair offer. While 
traditional dictator game paradigms (and economic paradigms more broadly) have generally 
focused on one-off paradigms (Kahneman et al., 1986) to avoid reputation effects, repeated, or 
iterative, economic games have more recently been embraced (Schlosser, Berger, & 
Fetchenhauer, 2018; Arechar, Kouchaki, & Rand, 2018; Phelps & Sokol-Hessner) as they allow 
for the inclusion of greater context (Guroglu, Will & Crone, 2014) and realistic interaction 
(King-Casas, Tomlin, Anen, Camerer, Quartz & Montague, 2005). Furthermore, once 
reputations are established, behavioral preference has been shown to be consistent (King-Casas 
et al., 2005). In our paradigm, given that reputation should already be established, we chose to 
include multiple trials to increase reliability. Specifically, we amended the basic premise of the 
dictator game to examine the effects of two specific factors on decision-making: 1) situational 
contingencies of fairness, and 2) characteristics of partner. 
Situational contingencies 
Rather than assess a baseline level of fairness/unfairness for each participant, we chose to 
examine two different fairness contingencies – selfish unfairness and vindictive unfairness. 
Participants were shown two contingencies on the screen and asked to choose between them (see 
Figure 4.1). One of the contingencies would represent a fair split of points (e.g., you receive 5 
points, the other player also receives 5 points) or an unfair split (you receive more points than the 
other player). However, the type of unfairness was varied throughout the task, where some trials 
would represent a “selfish” unfair option (e.g., fair option: you get 5 points and the recipient gets 
5 points; unfair option: you get 8 points and the recipient gets 2 points) or a “vindictive” unfair 
option (e.g., fair option: you get 5 points and the recipient gets 5 points; unfair option: you get 5 
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points and the recipient gets 2 points). This split was created in order to assess how antisocial 
motivations may differentially predict different kinds of aggression. Selfish unfairness reflects 
antisocial decisions where individuals are willing to harm others only when it is likely to directly 
benefit them, whereas vindictive unfairness reflects antisocial decisions where individuals see 
the harming of the other as the primary motivation given the lack of external reward. Given that 
both psychopathy and sadism predict unprovoked aggression (Reidy et al., 2011), and that some 
have questioned the utility of examining outcomes related to the heterogeneity of antisocial 
motivations (Sleep, Lynam, Hyatt, & Miller, 2017), our paradigm allows us to differentially 
assess how antisocial motivations relate to unprovoked aggressive acts. 
Partner characteristics 
Participants interacted with one of two different characters, each of whom had previously 
been introduced in a prior task (Study 2). These characters were confederates designed to 
emulate either a bully or victim prototype, which was demonstrated both through a profile 
(where each confederate described themselves in terms evocative of their character-type) and 
through a social interaction (e.g., the bully excluded the victim character in a round of 
Cyberball). 
Task details 
 Each trial was set to last for 4 seconds, with an ITI ranging between 750-2500 ms. 
Altogether, participants completed 160 trials (set across two identical fMRI scans) which took 16 
total minutes to complete. Each trial had both a situational (selfish, vindictive) and character 
(bully, victim) component, creating a 2x2 within subjects design, with forty trials in each 
condition (e.g., forty bully-vindictive trials, forty bully-selfish trials, forty victim-vindictive 
trials, and forty victim-selfish trials), which meant we were able to have 80 trials total for each 
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main effect (e.g. eighty trials interacting with the bully, split between forty selfish trials and forty 
vindictive trials). Fairness/unfairness trials were presented on the screen (counterbalanced by 
side) and participants were instructed to use their pointer fingers on each hand to choose which 
choice they preferred (see Figure 4.1).  
Analysis of behavioral results 
To examine the unfairness, we utilized generalized hierarchical linear modeling, through 
the lme4 r package (Bates et al., 2007). Unfairness was assessed via the number of decisions the 
participant chose the unfair option, relative to the fair option, in each condition. To increase the 
spread of our dichotomous dependent variable (fair/unfair), we used log-transformed odds 
(family binomial=”logit”). In model A, first level main effects (character, situation) and an 
interaction term (character*situation) were entered to examine the effects within the sample on 
behavioral responses to the task.  
Model A: 
(Unfairness)ij = 𝛽𝑜𝑗 +  𝛽1𝑗(Situation)𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽2𝑗(Character)𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽3(𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑗 +  𝑅𝑖𝑗 + 𝑈0𝑗 
In model B, we added level 2 predictors based on mean-centered  personality variables 
(CAST, SD3: Psychopathy) to examine how individual differences may account for unfairness 
(character*CAST, situation*CAST, character*SD3: Psychopathy, situation*SD3: Psychopathy).  
Model B: 
Level 1: 
(Unfairness)ij = 𝛽𝑜𝑗 +  𝛽1𝑗(Situation)𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽2𝑗(Character)𝑖𝑗 + 𝑅𝑖𝑗 + 𝑈0𝑗 
Level 2: 
𝛽0𝑗 =  𝛾 00 + 𝛾 01 (Sadism)j + 𝛾02( Psychopathy)j + U0j 
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𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾 10 
𝛽2𝑗 = 𝛾 20 
Mixed Model: 
(Unfairness)ij = 𝛾 00 + 𝛾 01 (Sadism) + 𝛾02(Psychopathy) + 𝛾1𝑗(Situation) +  𝛾2𝑗(Character) + 
𝛾11 (𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑗 ∗ (𝑆𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑚)𝑗 +  𝛾21 (𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑗 ∗ (𝑆𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑚)𝑗 +  𝛾12 (𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑗 ∗
(𝑃𝑠𝑦𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑦)𝑗 +  𝛾22 (𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑗 ∗ (𝑃𝑠𝑦𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑦)𝑗 + 𝑅ij + 𝑈0j  
fMRI Data Acquisition 
Neuroimaging data were collected utilizing a 3 Tesla Siemens Trio MRI scanner. The 
reward game was preceded by T2*-weighted echoplanar images (EPI; slice thickness = 3 mm; 38 
slices; TR=2s; TE=25ms; 92 x 92 matrix; FOV=230 mm; 2.5 x 2.5 x 3mm3 voxel size). 
Structural scans consisted of a T2*weighted, high resolution, matched-bandwidth (MBW) 
anatomical scan (TR = 4s; TE = 64ms; FOV = 230; 192 x 192 matrix; slice thickness = 3 mm; 38 
slices) and a T1* magnetization-prepared rapid-acquisition gradient echo (MPRAGE; TR = 1.9s; 
TE = 2.3ms; FOV = 230; 256 x 256 matrix; sagittal plane; slice thickness = 1mm; 192 slices). 
An oblique axial orientation was used for the MBW and EPI scans to reduce dropout of signal 
and optimize brain coverage. 
fMRI Data Processing & Analysis  
Statistical Parametric Mapping was used to process and analyze the neuroimaging data 
(SPM8; Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). In 
order to correct for head motion, spatial realignment was conducted during preprocessing of 
images. Realigned functional data were then coregistered to the high resolution MPRAGE 
image. The MPRAGE was segmented into cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), gray matter, and white 
matter. The normalization transformation matrix from the segmentation step was then applied to 
 63 
the functional and T2 structural images in order to transform them into standard stereotactic 
space as defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute and the International Consortium for 
Brain Mapping. An 8mm Gaussian kernel, full-width-at-half maximum, was used to smooth the 
functional data, increasing signal-to-noise ratio. Reward game trials were convolved with the 
canonical hemodynamic response function. High-pass temporal filtering with a cutoff of 128s 
was applied to remove low-frequency drift in the time-series. A restricted maximum likelihood 
algorithm was used to estimate serial autocorrelations with an autoregressive model order of 1. 
At the individual level, a fixed-effects analysis was modeled in which each condition was 
modeled (victim_selfish, victim_vindictive, bully_selfish, bully_vindictive). The parameter 
estimates from the GLM were used to create linear contrast images at the group level, where we 
collapsed across player type (victim or bully) and situation type (selfish or vindictive) to create 
main effect conditions of interest. Random effects, whole brain analyses were conducted using 
GLMFlex to examine these group effects on neural activation 
(http://mrtools.mgh.harvard.edu/index.php/GLM_Flex). Additionally, we conducted whole-brain 
regression analyses in which we regressed each participant’s self-reported sadism and 
psychopathy (mean scores) onto the contrast of interest (bully>victim, selfish>vindictive). To 
correct for multiple comparisons, we conducted a Monte Carlo simulation using 3dClustSim 
while estimating smoothness with the 3dFWHMx function in the AFNI software package (Ward, 
2000). Results of the 3dClustSim indicated a voxel-wise threshold of p<.005 combined with a 
minimum cluster size of 75 contiguous voxels for the whole-brain analysis, corresponding to 




Fit indices for Model A which examine the main effects of condition were superior to the 
null model (see Table 4.1). Results of model A examining the effects of condition (situation, 
character) revealed that both were significant predictors of unfairness. When given the 
opportunity for unfair decision-making, situational factors significantly impacted participant 
choice (ß=-1.39, SE=.14, p < .001), as participants were significantly more likely to make 
selfish decisions (72%) rather than vindictive decisions (58%). Unfair decision-making was also 
influenced by character (ß=-.59, SE=.15, p < .001) as participants were significantly more likely 
to make unfair decisions when interacting with the bully character (71%) than when interacting 
with the victim character (60%). We did not observe a significant situation by character 
interaction, so this term was removed from future analyses (which incorporated sadism and 
psychopathy scores). 
Model fit for the Model B, which incorporated personality variables as level 2 predictors, 
was superior to both the null model and model A (see Table 4.1). Both situation (ß=-1.43, 
SE=.10, p < .001) and character (ß=-1.39, SE=.14, p < .001) remained as significant predictors 
of unfairness. Neither psychopathy nor sadism were independent predictors of unfairness; 
however, both significantly interacted with situational and character cues as predicted. Sadism 
related to situation specific aggression (ß=.33, SE=.10, p < .001), such that increases in sadistic 
tendencies related to increased vindictive decision-making. Sadism also related to character 
specific aggression (ß=-.23, SE=.09, p < .05), such that increases in sadistic tendencies related to 
increased unfairness towards the bully character. Psychopathy scores were differentially related 
to situation (ß=-.39, SE=.19, p < .05), as increased in psychopathic tendencies actually related to 
increased selfish decision-making.  Psychopathy was not related to unfairness in the character 
condition (see Table 4.1 for all model statistics). 
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Neural results 
We first conducted whole-brain t-tests, to examine the effects of situation and character 
(see Table 4.2 for all neural results). There were no significant activation clusters which survived 
correction when examining the effect of situation (selfish trials > vindictive trials).  Looking at 
the effect of character (victim trials > bully trials), we found three significant clusters in the 
inferior temporal gyrus, the insula/putamen, and the ACC/mPFC (see Figure 4.2). Next, we ran 
regressions using our personality variables (psychopathy, sadism) on both the character (Victim 
trials > Bully trials) and situation (Selfish trials > Vindictive trials) contrasts, as there were 
significant behavioral differences based on these interactions. We did not find any significant 
clusters using sadism as a regressor in either the situation or character contrast. We did find a 
significant cluster for psychopathy in our situation contrast (selfish trials > vindictive trials), 
where increasing psychopathy scores correlated with increased activation in the brainstem (see 
Figure 4.3). 
Discussion 
  Research into aggressive delinquent populations often posit that deficient socioaffective 
processing in the presence of distress cues explains why some individuals may aggress or reduce 
aggressive interpersonal behaviors (Blair et al., 1997; Blair, 2005; Blair et al., 2016). However, a 
slew of recent behavioral studies examining personality constructs often associated with 
affective deficiencies have produced counterintuitive findings, where the “pathological” 
condition may actually help direct attentional resources towards interpersonal cues for the 
purposes of committing antisocial acts (Book et al., 2013; Book et al., 2007; Buckels et al., 2014; 
Denardo et al., 2018; Ritchie et al., 2018; Wheeler et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2008). In the 
current study, I attempted to disambiguate these two possibilities by examining how situational 
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and character cues would be used to guide decision-making. Consistent with aggression as a 
motivated process, I found that delinquent adolescents were responsive to both cues about a 
characters’ nature (bully, victim) and to situational contingencies (when an unfair act would 
benefit them (selfish) or when it would only hurt another (vindictive); interestingly, antisocial 
motivations seemed to focus attention on these characteristics, as both psychopathic and sadistic 
tendencies related to greater aggression in different contexts. Psychopathy scores related to 
increased unfairness in self-enriching situations but were not related to differential behavioral 
responses to character cues, whereas sadistic tendencies showed the opposite situational effect 
(increased unfairness in vindictive contexts) and was related to a behavioral propensity to show 
greater unfairness towards the bully. Rather than “deficiently” processing the scenario, both 
psychopathy and sadism related to increased use of character and situational cues to guide 
decision-making. 
 Exploring the neural results provide some clues as to how these regions may be 
implicated in processing cues during decision-making. The association of the inferior temporal 
gyrus was somewhat unsurprising, as this region has routinely been implicated in face-
processing (Allison et al., 1994) and familiar face repetition tasks (Schweinberger, Pickering, 
Jentzsch, Burton & Kaufmann, 2002). Activation was observed primarily in the Victim>Bully 
contrast rather than the situational contrast perhaps suggesting participants socially processed the 
victim more than the bully (which may actually be consistent with an empathy account).  
Additionally, activation in the ACC and insula may also comport with such an interpretation. 
Both the ACC (Carter et al., 2000) and the insula (Wager & Barrett, 2017) are often implicated 
in cognitive control tasks where individuals must regulate distracting inputs to regulate behavior 
for intrinsically motivated goals. Furthermore, the ACC has been additionally implicated in 
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value-based judgments (Kolling, Wittmann, Behrens, Boorman, Mars, & Rushworth, 2016). 
Given the association of both regions in the Victim>Bully condition – and that participants were 
generally fairer to the victim rather than the bully – this activation may reflect empathic 
processing aimed at reducing unfairness towards the victim character. Our task was not 
modelling behavioral choice but instead neural activation in the presence of given cues, so it is 
unclear how specific behaviors correspond to neural activation. Future analyses will focus on 
examining activation patterns during choice, rather than activation patterns in response to social 
cues. 
Our task as currently modeled did not yield significant activation patterns that 
distinguished situational cues. This is surprising, given that participants showed a strong 
behavioral effect to this condition switch. Additionally, the neural results for our personality 
regressors were not significant, as no activation patterns for sadism survived correction and the 
only significant cluster for psychopathy encompasses the brainstem. While implicated in salience 
processing (Lamm et al., 2011; Nelson et al., 2016), the lack of limbic and frontal activation is 
surprising. Perhaps our task was not sensitive to valuations; alternatively, other neuroeconomic 
approaches have focused on modeling specific decisions (Stallen, Rossi, Heijne, Smidts, De 
Dreu, & Sanfey, 2018) rather than conditions. While we aimed to explore neural activation as a 
function of changes in environmental processing, perhaps neural examinations focused at the 
trial, rather than aggregate, level may be more sensitive to activation in regions implicating 
valuation and social processing. 
Even though this group of delinquent adolescents – by selection criteria alone – are 
considered “antisocial,” their behavioral preferences and neural activation do not suggest that 
interpersonal cues inherently trigger unfair decision-making. Increased unfairness was observed 
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when it was of greater benefit to the individual (e.g. the selfish condition) rather than just for the 
vindictive sake of being unfair. Additionally, unfair decision-making was more often directed 
towards the immoral player (the bully) rather than the player being exploited (the victim). This 
suggests an interesting deviation from current debates in the literature than is usually discussed. 
Inconsistent with empathic deficit accounts, antisocial motivations were related to using social-
information to guide behavioral choices; however, inconsistent with what is often described in 
the “dark tetrad” literature, elevations in antisocial motivations did not lead to wide-spread 
increases in unfairness on their own. If anything, increased antisocial motivation (sadism) was 
tied to increased aggression to other antisocial actors (the bully). While aggression is aggression, 
this end-result seems, given the alternatives, somewhat prosocial. While I caution against 
suggesting aggression directed at antisocial actors is beneficial (the goal would likely be outright 
reductions of aggression, no matter the target), it is intriguing that “the core of evil,” as described 
by some (Paulhus et al., 2018) was related to a relatively prosocial outcome. 
Of course, there are alternative explanations to the above interpretation; perhaps, 
aggression against the bully is not a noble act, but rather a way of exercising malevolent desires 
in a more socially acceptable manner(Masui, Iriguchi, Nomura & Ura, 2011). Additionally, the 
increased unfairness directed towards the bully may be a leveling mechanism, as perhaps 
delinquent individuals feel the bully character may be of higher status and threaten their own 
standing (Babiak, 2000). While the specific motivation is unresolved, this provides counter 
evidence to claims made by some that malevolent personality traits are actually measuring 
malevolence (Paulhus et al, 2018) or that they predispose individuals to aggression against the 
vulnerable (Book et al., 2009). The truth seems to lie somewhere in the middle, where these traits 
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may direct attention towards interpersonal cues of others, but what the individual does with that 
information may be contextually driven. 
While this study adds an important contribution, there are several limitations which ought 
to be addressed in future inquiries. First, our decision to use a repeated dictator game a) was 
based on our desire to measure how sensitive delinquent adolescents would be to reputation 
inputs of their counterparts, and b) designed to ensure sufficient power and reliability to gauge 
any true effects in an fMRI analysis; however, classic approaches to the dictator game rely upon 
one-shot interactions with unknown partners (Kahneman et al., 1986). Future inquiries may want 
to focus on using unique individual profiles in one-off trials, rather than the repeated approach 
we employed here. Second, while our results suggest delinquent adolescents and antisocial 
motivations may influence sensitivity to socioaffective cues, our paradigm does not allow us to 
examine just how (in)sensitive to goal-relevant socioaffective cues antisocial actors are, and 
what sort of threshold is required. Future work should incorporate complementary approaches 
(e.g. eye-tracking, pupil dilation, GSR) to assess other weak metrics of attentional recognition in 
social-information processing paradigms. Finally, future examinations would be benefitted by 
including control groups of non-offending individuals. While we examined individual 
differences in sadistic and psychopathic traits, comparative work will be crucial for examining 
how delinquent populations differ from normatively developing individuals. 
Even with these limitations highlighted, the current study makes an important 
contribution to the research base by starting to answer how delinquent populations process 
socially-dynamic situations and use that information to guide behavioral choices. I observed that, 
counter to a strictly “aggressive individuals deficiently process social-information” argument, the 
results were much more nuanced. Our sample of antisocial adolescents were sensitive to 
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information about who they were playing and how their decisions would impact those 
individuals. Additionally, sadism and psychopathy were tied to differential behavioral choices. 
Interestingly, these individual difference variables did not always correspond to the most 
antisocial behavioral choices, which suggests that perhaps current measures of antisocial 
motivations are not “assessing the core of evil” (Paulhus et al., 2018). Perhaps, they may be 
assessing social motivations to attain resources and diminish rivals. While this may manifest 
itself in socially undesirable behaviors, viewing these delinquent behaviors as the end-result of 
socially-motivated reasoning instead of pathology is intriguing and in need of direct follow-up. 
Given the lack of efficacious treatments for violent behavior (Vachon, Lynam, & Johnson, 2014) 
and the assumption that delinquent individuals do not sufficiently process social information 
(Blair et al., 1997), our findings focusing on social motivations provide an alternative avenue for 
treatment. Perhaps incorporating social motivation change into interventions may be required to 





TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 4.1: Null, Model A, and Model B Model results 
 
 β SE AIC 
Null .97* .42 3240.5 
Model A    
Intercept 2.08*** .46 2966.4 
Situation -1.39*** .14  
Character -.59*** 015  
Situation*Character -.09 .19  
Model B    
Intercept 2.09*** .46 2497.5 
Situation -1.43*** .10  
Character -.61*** .10  
Sadism -.18 .46  
Psychopathy .46 .78  
Situation*Sadism .33*** .10  
Character*Sadism -.23* .09  
Situation*Psychopathy -.39* .19  
Character*Psychopathy -.19 .18  
 




Table 4.2: Neural results 
 
Region BA    x   y   z    t   k 
Main of character (Victim>Bully)      
ITG 20 L -54 -31 -14 5.29 82 
Putamen  R 21 17 4 4.56 148 a 
Insula  R 36 11 4 3.10 a 
ACC 32 R 6 32 10 4.04 190 b 
Superior Medial Gyrus 9 R 12 56 19 3.97 b 
     
Psychopathy correlation with Situation     
Brainstem  R 6 -37 -47 4.40 106 
 
Note. R refers to right and L refers to left. x, y, and z refer to MNI coordinates; t refers to the t-
score at those coordinates (local maxima); ITG refers to inferior temporal gyrus; ACC refers to 
anterior cingulate cortex; Regions that share the same superscript are part of the same cluster.  
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Figure 4.1: Modified dictator game: Example of bully-selfish, victim-selfish, bully-vindictive 































CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE AS A WAY FORWARD 
 The problem of juvenile delinquency is a costly one for society, and something that 
scientists and public policy makers have been trying to combat for some time. Developmental 
neuroscience has largely tried to tackle this problem by examining processes theoretically related 
to delinquency in both community (e.g. emotion dysregulation and cognitive control difficulties) 
and clinical samples (e.g. empathic deficits). However, there are some concerns that the field 
ought to address to ensure the research base currently amassed can speak to these problems.  
First, much of the developmental neuroscience work on risk-taking in normative community 
samples may not generalize to the populations most at-risk of delinquent acts. Second, there have 
been concerns raised that much of the neuroscience work examining the development of 
psychopathology may be too theoretically limited and not incorporate insights from other fields 
of human behavioral research. To address these issues, the current research program adapted 
social developmental neuroscience techniques to examine if behavioral and neural emotion 
regulation difficulties were comparable in a community versus delinquent sample, and if the 
current research base on normative risk-taking applied to those most at risk of offending (Study 
1). Additionally, I aimed to incorporate theoretical explanations often not accounted for by 
developmental neuroscientists, such as motivational approaches to examine bullying (Study 2) 
and proactive aggression (Study 3), both in delinquent samples. 
To compare the emotion regulation difficulties of both a community and delinquent 
sample (Study 1), I utilized a previously validated fMRI behavioral paradigm examining how 
non-emotional and emotional cues may disrupt successful decision-making. I found that while 
the community sample was generally better at regulating behavioral performance – consistent 
with much of the research base on risk-taking and emotional dysregulation – the presence of 
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affective cues led to differing patterns of dysregulation in community and delinquent 
adolescents. Appetitive cues were particularly problematic for the community sample, while 
aversive cues were problematic for the delinquent sample. Neural analyses revealed a similar 
interaction, as tracking in emotion regulation regions (IFG, mPFC) of the brain was dependent 
on both group (community or delinquent) and context (appetitive or aversive) factors. Regions 
implicated in cognitive control and successfully handling emotional disruption tracked 
significantly more for the community sample when presented with appetitive cues, with the 
opposite pattern holding for the delinquent sample (significantly more neural tracking of emotion 
regulation for aversive cues), suggesting that regulation of emotions are differentially employed 
by these populations. These findings suggest models of risk-taking need to better incorporate 
diverse samples to explain sub-optimal decision-making, and that the findings relevant to 
suboptimal outcomes in community samples may not translate well in explaining the suboptimal 
decision-making of delinquent populations.  
To explore whether insights from a motivational perspective of aggression could help 
inform what may explain suboptimal decision-making in delinquent adolescents, I conducted two 
studies examining how delinquent adolescents perceived and used social information cues. I 
explored how behavioral preferences (bullying) and interpersonal motivations (psychopathic and 
sadistic tendencies) would relate to specialized delinquent acts. In study 2, I examined how 
delinquent adolescents’ endorsements of bullying related to neurally processing scenes of social 
exploitation.  I utilized a modified fMRI Cyberball paradigm to simulate social exclusion (the act 
of a dominant partner segregating a weak partner from a social game) to examine if traditional 
evolutionary arguments – specifically, aggression may be a beneficial strategy – or empathy 
arguments – aggressive individuals are empathically deficient and fail to process social cues – 
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would correspond to neural activation patterns.  I found that as participants’ endorsement of 
bullying strategies increased, so did recruitment of neural regions implicated in motivational and 
emotion salience (amygdala, ventral striatum, insula). This result provides support to the 
evolutionary argument that bullying may not stem from empathic deficits or failures to process 
social information, but rather an interpersonal approach that prioritizes focusing on social 
information. 
Finally, to explore how motivational processes may undergird unprovoked aggressive 
actions, I incorporated insights from personality psychology into studying how antisocial 
motivations may differentially predict specific types of aggressive acts (Study 3). Specifically, I 
examined how two traits most often associated with unprovoked aggression (psychopathy and 
sadism) may differentially predict unfair decision-making. To this end, the same participants 
from Study 2 completed a modified dictator game during fMRI, where they were asked to split 
points in either a fair or unfair manner between themselves and one of the individuals they had 
just observed. The individuals they were paired with in the dictator game were the bully and 
victim (character type) from the social exclusion condition of study 2, and the unfair choices 
reflected either a self-interested (I am unfair to someone else because it benefits my position) or 
vindictive (I am unfair to someone else not because it benefits me but because it hurts the other 
player’s position) choice. Using HLM, I examined how antisocial traits (psychopathy, sadism) 
interacted with choice (self-interested, vindictive) and character (bully, victim) cues.  
Looking at main effects, participants responded to both situational and character cues, 
suggesting awareness of character and situational cues. Furthermore, regressions of psychopathy 
and sadism scores demonstrated each trait was related to different behavioral choices and cue 
sensitivity. Endorsement of psychopathy related to higher rates of self-interested relative to 
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vindictive aggression, but was not significantly related to unfair decision-making based on 
character type (bully or victim), suggesting that psychopathy is linked with opportunistic 
aggression where the offender may recognize situations where aggression garners clear benefits 
irrespective of partner. On the other hand, endorsement of sadism related to increasing 
aggression in situations without obvious benefit, suggesting the unfair choice satisfied more 
intrinsic needs. Additionally, sadism was significantly correlated with increasing aggression 
against the bully character relative to the victim character, suggesting the incorporation of 
character cues into the decision-making process. This distinction is important, as it suggests 
psychopathic aggression follows a more instrumental path (boosting one’s own standing) while 
sadistic aggression may relate more to assertion of dominance (diminution of other’s standing) or 
moral retribution. Neural analysis of main effects showed significant neural activation in salience 
regions (ACC, putamen, insula) when participants interacted with the victim, relative to bully; 
additionally, when psychopathy was regressed on the situational contrast (selfish trials > 
vindictive trials), I observed increased activation in a region of the brain implicated in arousal. 
Psychopathy was related to increased activation in the pain/salience network (pons and 
brainstem) in selfish relative to vindictive trials (when they were most aggressive), suggesting 
neural responsivity in arousal tied situational cues.  
Combined, these studies illuminate several issues endemic to the amassed research base, 
while highlighting how current practices can be amended to be more reflective of – and useful to 
– the most at-risk populations and problematic behaviors. Specifically, the same types of 
emotion-regulation difficulties observed in community samples is likely not to blame for 
suboptimal decision-making observed in delinquent youth (Study 1). Additionally, 
developmental neuroscience research must better incorporate findings from the bullying 
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literature (Study 2) and studies of individual differences (Study 3) to tackle problematic behavior 
reduction, as antisocial behavioral patterns and motivations are integral to understanding the root 
of delinquent acts. Viewing aggression as dysfunction may reflect a societal preference, but may 
not be reflective at the individual level when considering a wide array of interpersonal outcomes.  
This also highlights the need to better study the development and trajectory of antisocial 
motivations, as curbing (or even reversing) their endorsement will prove key in future 
intervention work.   
Constraints on generalizability 
 Addressing the issues of research past – namely, a lack of comparative affective 
processing studies and an over-reliance on theories of delinquency which are at best, incomplete 
- was a major goal of this dissertation program. While preliminary, these studies highlight that 
behavioral misconduct is something that needs to be accounted for by future neuroscientific 
research, as school problems are strong predictors of adult maladjustment (Moffitt & Caspi, 
2001) and imprisonment (Rocque & Paternoster, 2011); furthermore, their ability to predict later 
life outcomes have been shown to be more robust than psychological variables (Dressel & Farid, 
2018), suggesting those who ignore institutional misconduct while attempting to predict future 
maladjustment do so at their peril. This does not mean that psychological variables should not be 
accounted for; rather, it implies that their application towards understanding delinquency need to 
be better targeted. As discussed in study 2 and study 3, pairing specific behaviors with specific 
motivational variables may be key to unlocking many of the puzzles science has yet to answer in 
terms of mitigating delinquent outcomes.   
Even with these strengths highlighted, there are a number of weakness that need to be 
highlighted. First and foremost, the reliance on cross-sectional methodology makes it difficult to 
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address the developmental (or innate) nature of these questions. Terrie Moffitt, author of one of 
the most comprehensive longitudinal studies recently remarked, “All people are not created 
equal […] some have real problems right out of the starting block,” (Starr, 2018).  The results of 
study 1 certainly are in support of the notion that by adolescence, those acting delinquently are 
different from those who are not; however, I am unable to address how early this distinction can 
be made. Future neuroscientific research will need to focus on how psychobehavioral trajectories 
map onto early brain structures and neural responsivity to socioaffective stimuli throughout 
development. This likely means starting scanning on infants and following through adulthood. 
Large-scale studies are currently being applied to adolescent populations (e.g. Adolescent Brain 
Cognitive Development Study) as well as infants (e.g., Baby Connectome), but likely need to 
start at earlier ages and span decades to determine if affective processing deviations are 
adaptations to environmentally-driven factors (e.g. life experiences and neighborhood effects) or 
evidence of innate differences.  
Second, these findings do not speak to the immutability of aberrant emotional processing, 
either as a function of misconduct or motivational variables. There is evidence that 
environmental inputs can change neuropsychological functioning – e.g. a recent study found 
being imprisoned for only a short time made individuals significantly more impulsive (Meijers, 
Harte, Meynen, Cuijpers & Sherder, 2018) – but little is known about how said individuals 
would respond once back in a more normative environment. Quasi-experimental approaches 
described above to provide information about the populations problems like delinquency are 
likely to be most present, but do not necessarily answer questions about why those individuals 
engaged in delinquent acts in the first place or if they eventually return to baseline sometime 
after leaving detention.   
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Third, while the findings that delinquency were important for understanding emotion 
regulation disruption, I acknowledge the need to employ more expansive and comprehensive 
measures of problematic behaviors in future examinations. Surely not every act of misconduct is 
equivalently deleterious, nor is surveillance and punishment assumed to be fairly adjudicated 
(Wald & Losen, 2003). In spite of the research showing evidence of racial bias (Wald & Losen, 
2003), institutional misconduct does seem to be a variable worthy of study. Perhaps, to mitigate 
bias, future inquiries of delinquency may need to focus on characteristics of delinquent acts 
(such as intent, victim selection, etc.) as an improvement for measuring problematic behaviors 
(Welner, 2003). Furthermore, being able to provide more information regarding clinically 
relevant diagnostic criteria would be beneficial for future inquiries. Both internalizing and 
externalizing symptomology may be impacted by similar aberrations in affective processing 
(Caspi et al., 2014), meaning future research must focus on understanding delinquency in 
conjunction with other heavily studied psychological variables (e.g. symptomology, attachment, 
temperament, etc.). 
Finally, I see my attempts at studying top-down accounts of delinquent behaviors as a 
preliminary step in the right direction, but one that needs to be built upon with an eye towards 
maximizing generalizability and ensuring adequate internal validity. All three studies suggest 
that top-down processes may account for the types of social stimuli individuals may focus on – 
however, in all but one (Study 3), the effects of top-down motivation are largely “implicit”. In 
study 1, I observed that delinquent adolescents tended to focus on aversive cues, to their 
detriment, while community adolescents tended to focus on appetitive cues, also to their 
detriment. Community adolescents’ attention towards appetitive cues has been argued to stem 
from the activation of “approach” processes (Crone & Dahl, 2012; Nelson, et al., 2016), and I 
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argue that delinquent adolescents’ fixation towards aversive cues may be linked with a social 
strain account (Agnew, 1992). However, these hypotheses need to be followed up on with an 
emphasis on testing specific types of approach motivators (e.g. romantic, friendship, money) and 
strain identifiers (e.g. threat, neglect, scarcity) to better support these suppositions. In study 2, I 
observed that bullying behaviors corresponded with increased attention towards social 
exploitation; however, the method employed was passive-viewing, limiting the inferences one 
should responsibly make. While study 3 did allow participants to make an active choice (i.e. 
showing how their preferences may guide attentional processing towards specific goal-oriented 
cues), I did not observe activation patterns for sadism and psychopathy that survived correction 
(other than activation in arousal centers for the interaction between psychopathy and situation).  
While this finding may be impacted by a small n, the seeming lack of connection between self-
reported psychological variables, observed behavior, and neural signal is a limitation that – while 
observed in other inquiries (Michaska, Kinzler, & Decety, 2013) – suggests more focus need be 
aimed at explaining this dissonance. 
Closing thoughts 
 In spite of these limitations, this research program represents an important first step in 
remedying some of the problems of past research into the development and maintenance of 
delinquent behaviors. Psychology and neuroscience research into problematic behaviors have 
been undergoing challenge (Caspi et al., 2014), and researchers are more than ever recognizing 
the need for innovative statistical (Snyder & Hankin, 2017) and experimental (Mancilla-Caceras 
et al., 2015) approaches to redefining and capturing problematic behaviors are paramount. In 
regards to delinquency, there continues to be a focus on a select few syndromes (Sharp, 2012) 
without significant attention paid to ensuring full behavioral coverage (Vachon, Lynam & 
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Johnson, 2014). The samples in my dissertation explicitly focused on recruitment based on 
delinquency, rather than a preconceived notion of who should/should not be included based on 
explicit externalizing symptoms. Additionally, I specifically focused on tying delinquent acts to 
highly specified predictors (e.g. bullying tendencies to social exploitation, psychopathy to 
opportunism, sadism to punition) to better explore open questions regarding emotion-processing 
deviations and the role of antisocial motivations guiding attentional processing in a top-down 
manner. 
 The results of each of these studies supported the broad hypothesis that behavioral 
choices and social motivations do act in a top-down fashion to direct neural resources to relevant 
socioaffective cues. Also supported is the notion that delinquent adolescents appear qualitatively 
different than their community peers, in that they seem to have greater attentional fixation on 
aversive cues. In the two later studies, one could argue that this attentional fixation on aversive 
cues may be used by these delinquent adolescents to help guide [antisocial] decision-making, a 
finding important to incorporate into potential treatment applications. If delinquent individuals 
act antisocially because of explicit attentional focus towards interpersonal cues – rather than 
deficient social processing – than interventions must shift focus towards changing supraordinate 
goals rather than basic psychological abilities (e.g. emotion-recognition). Given that new, 
unproven treatments aimed at such problems are often adopted wholesale without heed paid to 
theory or empirical findings (Meichenbaum & Lilienfeld, 2018) inquiries addressing such 
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